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I. INTRODUCTION
Copyright infringement is a tort.1 As such, it aims at prompting
third parties to consider the specific social costs associated with some
types of unauthorized dealing with works of authorship, by holding
them liable in tort for actions that undermine the creative incentives
of authors. Any attempt to explain the rationale behind the choice of
standards for copyright liability and the nature of the fair use doctrine
could therefore gain valuable insight from the general theory and eco-
nomic analysis of tort law, in particular accident law.2
Copyright law internalizes benefits to spur creative activity,
thereby mirroring the internalizing function of tort law,3 which inter-
nalizes costs with a view to inducing third parties to exercise care so
as to avoid harming another.4 Dealing with copyrighted works of au-
thorship could be paralleled with “risky behavior” that threatens to
cause an “accident” in the form of reduced authorial incentives. Much
like the law of accidents, the standard for copyright liability must re-
flect considerations pertaining to the efficient precautions that the po-
tential infringers have to take to avoid accidents.5 Copyright
1. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Distrib. Corp. v. Fisher, 10 F. Supp. 745, 747 (D. Md.
1935) (“The violation of a copyright is classed as a tort and for injunctive purposes
may be considered analogous to trespassing on real estate.”).
2. Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image: Harms, Benefits, and
the Uses and Limits of Analogy, 34 MCGEORGE L. REV. 533 (2003) [hereinafter
Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image].
3. Id. at 535. On the internalizing function of tort law, see generally DANIEL H.
COLE & PETER Z. GROSSMAN, PRINCIPLES OF LAW & ECONOMICS 270 (2d ed. 2011);
JEFFREY L. HARRISON & JULES THEEUWES, LAW & ECONOMICS 252–53 (2008).
4. As suggested by Wendy J. Gordon, the structure of copyright protection is consis-
tent with the common law’s entitlement patterns. Wendy J. Gordon, Of Harms
and Benefits: Torts, Restitution, and Intellectual Property, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 449,
450 (1992). She makes the point that, for the purposes of cost-benefit analysis,
harms and benefits are treated the same. Id. at 451. There is also no inconsis-
tency with the general rule of restitution law excluding payments for voluntary
actions benefitting others because both legal institutions promote the formation
of contracts. Restitution law provides the volunteer with an incentive to propose a
deal before benefitting anyone. Through the grant of an exclusive right in works
of authorship, copyright law empowers authors to seek rents in the markets for
the original work or its derivatives. Id. at 472–73.
5. Oren Bracha & Patrick R. Goold, Copyright Accidents, 96 B.U. L. REV. 1025,
1037–40 (2016) (providing an anatomy of the copyright accident; examining lia-
bility for dealing with earlier works in those cases where at the time the infring-
ing act occurred, only a risk of infringement existed because the copyrighted
status of the appropriated material was unknown to the alleged infringer or could
only be ascertained through measures that were not cost-efficient; and sug-
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provisions are concerned with both authors’ and potential infringers’
activity levels remaining optimal from a social welfare perspective.
The choice of a proper liability standard is pivotal to achieving copy-
right’s utilitarian purposes. Policymakers, legislators, and courts have
a wide array of options at their disposal, including strict liability, neg-
ligence and its various forms, or a combination thereof.
It seems that the closest parallel that can be drawn to the law of
accidents would be the one conceptualizing copyright infringement as
a bilateral accident with variable activity levels.6 The probability of an
accident increases as potential copyright infringers seek to maximize
their own utility by raising their levels of activity in dealing with copy-
righted works without the author’s permission. On the other hand,
some of those unauthorized uses may turn out to be beneficial to social
welfare because they promote cultural or expressive values, for in-
stance. Activity levels of authors are also variable in that they corre-
spond to the level of incentives generated by the system of copyright
protection.
Copyright infringement is considered to be a strict liability tort.7
Legal scholarship has challenged this fundamental tenet of copyright
law predominantly on two grounds. First, the regime of strict liability
affirming liability in cases of inadvertent plagiarism allegedly broad-
ens the scope of the right in a disproportionate manner that threatens
to suppress independent creation.8 Second, by requiring evidence of
harm in order to find infringement, the doctrine of fair use essentially
renders copyright infringement a tort based on negligence.9
gesting that such accidental copyright infringement should be subjected to a neg-
ligence standard that gives “due weight” to such risk).
6. Cf. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image, supra note 2, at 537.
7. Buck v. Jewell-La Salle Realty Co., 283 U.S. 191, 199 (1931); De Acosta v. Brown,
146 F.2d 408, 412 (2d Cir. 1944) (“[T]he protection accorded literary property
would be of little value if it did not go against third persons, or if, it might be
added, insulation from payment of damages could be secured by a publisher by
merely refraining from making inquiry.”); PAUL GOLDSTEIN, 2 GOLDSTEIN ON COP-
YRIGHT § 7.0.1, at 7:3–7:4 (1996) (noting how liability insurance can protect third
parties against the harshness of that rule); WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPY-
RIGHT § 21:38 (2018) (highlighting the requirement of volitional conduct).
8. Dane S. Ciolino & Erin A. Donelon, Questioning Strict Liability in Copyright, 54
RUTGERS L. REV. 351 (2002); Avihay Dorfman & Assaf Jacob, Copyright as Tort,
12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 59 (2011) (considering strict liability as an inappro-
priate rule for protecting intangible property because of the difficulties associated
with demarcating the boundaries of such property and signaling ownership; in
contrast, tangible property is easier to demarcate). For a general critique on the
enforcement of the strict liability rule against innocent infringers, see Kent Sin-
clair Jr., Liability for Copyright Infringement—Handling Innocence in a Strict-
Liability Context, 58 CALIF. L. REV. 940 (1970).
9. Patrick R. Goold, Is Copyright Infringement a Strict Liability Tort?, 30 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 305 (2015); Steven Hetcher, The Immorality of Strict Liability in Copy-
right, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 5–13 (2013) (invoking the general argu-
ment of liability being immoral unless based on fault to support the proposition
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In this Article, I argue that the tort of copyright infringement con-
stitutes a mixed system of liability, which resorts to both strict liabil-
ity and negligence to achieve the utilitarian aim of promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts, as instructed by the Intellec-
tual Property Clause of the Constitution.10 Indeed, copyright infringe-
ment is structured to mirror trespass upon property, while the fair use
doctrine operates as a negligence standard optimizing activity levels
involving some form of dealing with an earlier work—such as incre-
mental authorship, critical commentary, news reporting, or the devel-
opment of new technologies—which the exclusive right in that work is
not supposed to suppress. In this Part (Part I), I briefly summarize the
main points of my argument.
Turning to the economics of accident law facilitates the analysis by
highlighting the possible advantages and disadvantages of the various
standards of liability with respect to the avoidance of accidents and
the inducement of optimal activity levels (Part II). The analysis shows
that both strict liability and negligence are vital to the implementa-
tion of the copyright system’s goals. In order to secure incentives for
the production of authorial works, copyright confers upon its owner a
profit-maximizing opportunity in the form of a property right capable
of being traded. Reliance investments in the creation of new works of
authorship cannot be effectively induced unless (1) the intangible sub-
ject matter of property is precisely demarcated and (2) it is guaranteed
to the author, as a matter of principle, that he or she will be able to
obtain the economic benefit of the full market value for his or her crea-
tion. For these reasons, strict liability for trespassing upon copyright
property should be the default rule.
that copyright infringement is in fact a tort based on negligence); see also Wendy
J. Gordon, The Concept of “Harm” in Copyright, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
THE COMMON LAW, (Shyamkrishna Balganesh ed., 2013) (suggesting that the con-
cept of harm itself undoubtedly justifies redress when rivalrous diversion of cus-
tomers comes into play, whereas the copyright owner would have to substantiate
harm himself or herself in cases where the infringement claim relates to foregone
licensing opportunities; explaining that this could at times require the courts to
look at a plaintiff’s personal situation and ascertain some sort of “grave need” to
internalize foregone benefits; and examining the issue also from a philosophical
perspective to eloquently canvas the types of harm that would be actionable
under a reformulated tort of copyright infringement, which would require plain-
tiffs to prove harm including subjective distress). Others consider that the availa-
bility of the fair use defense results in a number of copyright disputes being
resolved on the basis of a flexible standard and not a rule. See Christopher
Sprigman, Copyright and the Rule of Reason, 7 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L.
317 (2009) (drawing parallels to antitrust analysis and suggesting that liability
should be designed to include dealings with earlier works that are per se infring-
ing and secondary uses that must be subjected to the scrutiny of a rule of reason
analysis based on the four factors set out in section 107 of the Copyright Act with
the plaintiff bearing the burden of proof).
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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In addition, I argue that copyright’s purpose of generating incen-
tives for creativity is better achieved through general and abstract
norms rather than flexible standards. On the other hand, the constitu-
tional mandate from which copyright law derives its legitimacy rests
on the premise that some dealings with copyrighted works should be
permitted even during the copyright term to create a “breathing
space,” which eventually maximizes social welfare. Those activities,
examples of which are listed in the preamble of section 107 of the Cop-
yright Act,11 should be subjected to a negligence standard because
they are of such a nature that they should be carried out as frequently
and intensively as possible. A negligence standard is apt to serve this
purpose. Fair use mirrors negligence in that it allows third parties to
engage in socially desirable activities while imposing on them obliga-
tions to exercise care toward the legitimate interests of the copyright
owner. Importantly, the nature of the fair use doctrine as a negligence
standard allows for optimal decentralization effects as it makes it pos-
sible for the courts to apply personalized standards of care. I argue
that the application of the fair use doctrine by the courts reflects that
approach (Part III).
Subsequently, I analyze the legal nature of fair use as a negligence
standard (Part IV). Firstly, I examine the reasons for subjecting the
duty imposed on third parties not to trespass upon the copyright
owner’s property right and their socially desirable dealings with ear-
lier works to different liability standards. It would actually be impos-
sible to use one single standard of liability. Strict liability would
suppress socially desirable activities such as critical commentary. And
negligence would not be an efficient standard for inducing optimal cre-
ative incentives. I take the opportunity to stress that strict liability is
indispensable also because it is capable of creating social norms that
would give rise to social environments in which copyrights are
respected. It is only through abstract and general rules commanding
immediate and unanimous agreement that the internalization of
norms can eventually be achieved. Then, I look more closely at the
11. Copyright Act § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012) (“Notwithstanding the provisions of
sections 106 and 106A, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (in-
cluding multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research, is not an in-
fringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any
particular case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include—(1) the
purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) the nature of the copyrighted
work; (3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential mar-
ket for or value of the copyrighted work. The fact that a work is unpublished shall
not itself bar a finding of fair use if such finding is made upon consideration of all
the above factors.”).
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nature of fair use as a negligence standard. In particular, I examine
its operation as an ex post negligence standard, its capacity to factor in
the effect of the adopted standard on innovation, and its commonali-
ties with the structured balancing test of general tort law. The fair use
calculus reflects a rule of reason, which requires the copyright owner
to forego some of his or her economic benefits in some contexts where
the exemption of socially desirable secondary uses from copyright lia-
bility would maximize social welfare. This presupposes, however, that
the exemption of specific dealings with earlier copyrighted works will
not disproportionally reduce creative incentives by barring copyright
enforcement.
In that regard, I argue that the four statutory factors set out in
section 107 of the Copyright Act may be perceived not only as repre-
senting the equities driving the application of copyright’s rule of rea-
son but also as dimensions of care. This is because they essentially
circumscribe, for instance, the amount of permissible copying in both
quantitative and qualitative terms or the extent to which the secon-
dary user may encroach upon the plaintiff’s markets without infring-
ing the earlier copyright. Reflecting a negligence calculus, the
assessment of fair use does not lend itself to categorical presumptions
and requires a meticulous correlation of all relevant factors within the
framework of a structured balancing test. I also argue that the proce-
dural nature of fair use as an affirmative defense is dictated by the
need to enforce the substantive law mandate encapsulated in copy-
right’s rule of reason.
In this same Part (Part IV), I also take the opportunity to make
some general observations about the nature of the fair use adjudica-
tion process. Constituting copyright’s rule of reason, the incentives-
access paradigm fosters a type of decision making known as “rule-sen-
sitive particularism.”12 While the assessment takes into account the
specifics of the individual case, it should not undermine the general
rule that authors should be granted property rights in their works as a
means to induce creativity. As academic scholarship has already ob-
served, fair use has gained a lot in predictability through the years.
Some general principles have been obtained from the consistent treat-
ment of specific categories of uses by courts that already conducted
fair use assessments. Arguably, the fair use standard has in the
meantime accommodated some “rule-like” aspects in the sense that we
are now able to tell with a considerable amount of certainty how some
types of secondary uses are going to be assessed in the context of a fair
use analysis. This does not mean, of course, that the courts may by-
pass the analysis of the four factors.
12. Frederick Schauer, Rules and the Rule of Law, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 645,
649–50 (1991).
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Another implication of the nature of fair use as a negligence stan-
dard is that it induces the copyright owner to exercise care himself or
herself so as to minimize the risk of reduced authorial incentives.
Given that the defendant will escape liability if he or she complies
with the standard emerging from the fair use analysis, the copyright
owner qualifies as the ultimate bearer of the accident’s costs. Hence,
the copyright owner will have an incentive to do anything that could
minimize the potential loss, including the development of a market
that has not yet been exploited or some sort of positive action toward
the elimination of transaction costs that deprive the copyright owner
of licensing revenue—just to name two examples where the negligence
standard implemented by the fair use doctrine prompts the copyright
owner to exercise care. The analysis presents fair use as a negligence
standard adopted to address a bilateral accident where both injurers
and victims may minimize the costs associated therewith by exercis-
ing due care and adjusting their activity levels.
After sketching the nature of copyright infringement as a mixed
system of liability, I seek to illustrate the analysis with examples
taken from important fair use precedents (Part V). In my concluding
Part, (Part VI), I argue that it is not necessary to restructure the tort
of copyright infringement to mirror negligence in order to avoid the
over-enforcement of copyright. As they stand now, the rules on copy-
right infringement provide for a legal framework in which all equities
involved may effectively be balanced in light of copyright’s utilitarian
aims. Policy disagreements may well be discussed and resolved within
the current legal framework. However, because this framework is de-
veloping, it requires further analysis.
To maintain the flow of my argument and focus on its essential
aspects, I shifted part of the analysis to the footnotes of my Article,
where I occasionally discuss some issues in more detail and review
opposite or complementary lines of argumentation.
II. STRICT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE IN
THE LAW OF ACCIDENTS
In this Part, I briefly review the effectiveness of strict liability and
negligence standards in inducing economically justifiable precautions
when one engages in risky behavior.13 Drivers, for instance, may re-
duce the probability and, therefore, the social costs of accidents by in-
creasing the level of care they exercise while driving their cars.
Increments in care are socially beneficial as long as the marginal cost
to drivers remains lower than the marginal benefit in reducing the
13. See generally STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW
177–206 (2004).
2018] FAIR USE AS REGULATION OF ACTIVITY LEVELS 391
probability of an accident.14 Accordingly, the aggregate welfare of
drivers (injurers) and pedestrians (victims) is maximized when drivers
are incentivized to exercise a moderate degree of care. Social welfare
is then maximized exactly because the expected total cost of accidents
is minimized.15
A. Unilateral Accidents: Care and Activity Levels
First, let’s examine how tort law seeks to induce injurers into exer-
cising the optimal level of care by holding them liable for causing an
accident on the basis of a predetermined standard of liability.16 It is
assumed that the injurers cannot alter their activity levels by choos-
ing to drive more or less frequently, for instance.
In the absence of liability, there is no economic incentive for driv-
ers to exercise care toward the interest of third parties.17 The costs of
precaution would then have to be borne by the victims.18 Under a
strict liability standard, injurers have an incentive to exercise moder-
ate care.19 They cannot escape liability and incurring the costs of mod-
erate care minimizes their combined costs of taking precautions and
paying for accidents they might cause.20 Under a negligence regime,
injurers have the possibility of avoiding any liability by acting accord-
ing to a standard of reasonableness, which at least from the stand-
point of the economic analysis of law, can only implicate a duty to
exercise care at a moderate level since that is the degree of care that
minimizes the social costs of accidents.21 As already indicated, injur-
14. ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW & ECONOMICS 201 (6th ed. 2012); RICHARD
A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 192–93 (9th ed. 2014).
15. GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
26–29 (1970); COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 272; see also Robert Cooter,
Unity in Tort, Contract and Property: The Model of Precaution, 73 CALIF. L. REV.
1 (1985) (arguing that the “equity goal of compensating victims and the efficiency
goal of minimizing costs to society as a whole” are separate but complementary
legal principles (emphasis added)). It is not always desirable to eliminate the risk
of accidents, especially when some social benefit may be derived from some risky
or even negligent activity. Therefore, some accident probability should be toler-
ated in most cases. See ALAN DEVLIN, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS 66–68 (2015).
16. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 201; THOMAS J. MICELI, THE ECONOMIC AP-
PROACH TO LAW 19 (3d ed. 2017).
17. SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 179.
18. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 201.
19. SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 179–80.
20. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 203.
21. Richard A. Posner, A Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 32–33 (1972)
(arguing that Judge Learned Hand “unwittingly” sketched the economic under-
pinnings of the negligence standard in United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159
F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947), where he ruled that a defendant should be liable if the
expected cost of the accident exceeds the cost of precaution (B). An accident’s ex-
pected cost is calculated by multiplying the probability of an accident (P) with a
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ers would take the efficient amount of precautions even under strict
liability, since they have an economic incentive to act toward minimiz-
ing their own cost of taking precautions.22 Hence, in the case of unilat-
eral accidents with fixed activity levels, both strict liability and
negligence standards are capable of creating incentives for injurers to
act in their own best interest toward the achievement of the socially
efficient outcome.23
Choices between the two alternative standards may be driven by
various considerations.24 Strict liability would be preferable to negli-
gence, for instance, where the courts do not possess the requisite infor-
mation to assess the optimal precaution costs.25 Strict liability, on the
other hand, tends to increase the costs of the judicial system since the
prospect of successful litigation encourages victims to sue.26 Negli-
gence may, however, impose higher administrative costs than strict
liability where disagreements over whether due care has been exer-
cised—and therefore the probability of a trial—are more likely or
where the cost of finding out what amounts to an efficient amount of
precaution is particularly high.27
Accidents may not only be avoided through the exercise of precau-
tions. Injurers could also minimize the risk of accidents by reducing
the degree to which they engage in dangerous activity.28 They could
drive less, for instance. On that account, potential copyright infringers
could decrease the risk of creative incentives being reduced as a result
of their activity by reducing the frequency or the intensity with which
they are dealing with works of authorship.
Generally speaking, activity levels tend to be excessive both under
a rule of no liability and under a negligence standard. If the injurers
value representing the magnitude of the potential harm (L). Hence, liability
emerging from the negligence calculus can be expressed in the following algebraic
formula: B>PL).
22. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 206.
23. A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 46 (4th ed.
2011); SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 181.
24. MICELI, supra note 16, at 22–23.
25. DEVLIN, supra note 15, at 71; POLINSKY, supra note 23, at 46.
26. STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT LAW 264 (1987).
27. Hans-Bernd Scha¨fer & Frank Mu¨ller-Langer, Strict Liability Versus Negligence,
in TORT LAW AND ECONOMICS: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 24 (Michael
Faure ed., 2d ed. 2009); see generally POLINSKY, supra note 23, at 55; POSNER,
supra note 14, at 208; see also DEVLIN, supra note 15 (noting that while the aver-
age cost of a strict liability case may be lower, it is likely that the total costs of
strict liability cases exceed, under some circumstances, that of cases decided
under a negligence standard).
28. Mitchell A. Polinsky, Strict Liability vs. Negligence in a Market Setting, 70 AM.
ECON. REV. 363 (1980) (discussing excessive entry under negligence rules and
suggesting that the problem could be solved if the negligence standard takes into
account each firm’s level of care and output); Steven Shavell, Strict Liability Ver-
sus Negligence, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (1980).
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are not bound to be held liable or can simply avoid liability by exercis-
ing due care, then they are also not likely to consider reducing their
levels of activity.29
Notably, the marginal utility derived from increments in activity
gradually diminishes. Under a strict liability regime, rational injurers
have an economic incentive to act efficiently, since the negative exter-
nalities of their activity will be fully internalized. They are under a
legal obligation to compensate for any accident losses they might im-
pose on victims. Hence, injurers would engage in risky behavior only
to the extent that marginal profits outweigh marginal costs, including
the cost of precaution, which is also the efficient outcome for society.30
At first glance, strict liability seems to be superior to negligence in
inducing the optimal amount of activity levels.31 However, this would
only be valid when the reduction of a defendant’s activity levels is in-
deed the welfare-maximizing solution.32 Furthermore, where injurers
are risk-averse toward the prospect of liability, which is very often the
case, it is expected that activity levels would be suboptimal.33 Hence,
in the copyright context, strict liability is likely to have a deterrent
effect upon socially desirable dealings with copyrighted works, such as
parodies or transformative uses that increase social welfare. Fair use
and the other limitations to copyright seek to avoid the over-deter-
rence of third party dealings with earlier works of authorship.
B. Bilateral Accidents: Care and Activity Levels
Often, accidents would not be attributed to only one party since
both injurers and victims may be capable of taking precautions. The
social costs of accidents could be further minimized when both parties
exercise moderate care.34 This occurs when both parties invest in pre-
cautions up to the level where their marginal cost equals the marginal
benefit they generate in reducing—but not necessarily eliminating—
the probability of an accident.35
The choice of a liability standard affects the equilibrium of the
game of strategic interaction into which injurers and victims engage
themselves.36 In the absence of any liability, victims would not ration-
29. Shavell, supra note 28, at 12.
30. Id. at 11.
31. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 212; POLINSKY, supra note 23, at 51–52.
32. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of Tort
Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 876–77 (1981).
33. SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 260–61.
34. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 205; HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 3, at
270; John Prather Brown, Toward an Economic Theory of Liability, 2 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1973).
35. SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 182–83.
36. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 205; DEVLIN, supra note 15, at 72; HARRISON &
THEEUWES, supra note 3, at 276; SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 182–83.
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ally do anything else other than exercise moderate care as it is them
who bear the total cost of accidents.37 Under strict liability, injurers’
best choice is apparently to exercise moderate care since the victims’
dominant strategy is not to exercise optimal care.38 To induce the vic-
tims to do their part in reducing the potential cost of accidents, a de-
fense of contributory negligence is necessary.39
In contrast, a negligence standard imposing a duty to exercise
moderate care on injurers would prompt both parties to take optimal
precautions.40 Injurers have an obvious incentive to exercise moderate
care, otherwise they would have to incur the total costs of accident
losses. Given that injurers will escape liability if they comply with the
duty of care imposed on them, victims have to act toward minimizing
their own potential accident losses.
The efficient outcome can also be achieved, as already suggested,
under strict liability with contributory negligence.41 Again, the vic-
tims’ failure to take the precautions necessary to minimize the ex-
pected social cost of accidents would bring them into a position where
they would have to bear a significant part of an accident’s costs. Thus,
exercising moderate care is the victims’ dominant strategy, which in
turn induces injurers to exercise moderate care as well.42 The same is
valid under strict liability with comparative negligence.43 Victims
would not be able to recover that part of the loss which amounts to the
percentage that their negligent behavior contributed to the total loss.
Accordingly, victims have an incentive to incur the costs of moderate
care because these are lower than the (partial) loss that would have to
be sustained later on as a result of their negligent behavior—that is,
their failure to minimize the social costs of accidents. Injurers then
have no choice other than exercising moderate care since the victims’
dominant strategy is to avoid comparative fault. Otherwise, they
would have to face liability for an accident’s total costs. Both types of
negligence lead to the efficient outcome.44
Let’s now turn to appreciate what liability standard leads to the
efficient outcome when both parties can take precautions and regulate
their activity levels to minimize the expected costs of accidents.
Absent liability, injurers would neither take precautions nor re-
strict their activity levels. Victims would, of course, seek to minimize
their own expected costs.45 Conversely, strict liability induces victims
37. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 3, at 280; SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 183–84.
38. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 3, at 281; SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 184.
39. POLINSKY, supra note 23, at 49.
40. MICELI, supra note 16, at 25; SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 185–86.
41. SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 184–85.
42. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 3, at 281–83.
43. SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 187.
44. HARRISON & THEEUWES, supra note 3, at 283.
45. DEVLIN, supra note 15, at 80.
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to refrain from exercising optimal care and increase activity levels
while injurers will seek to exercise due care and reduce activity
levels.46
A liability standard based on negligence would indeed provide in-
centives for injurers to exercise the optimal degree of care but at the
same time allow them to engage in excessive activity levels.47 In this
case, the imposition of care duties on victims, be it in the form of con-
tributory or comparative negligence, would not have any effect on the
injurers’ dominant strategy.48
An attempt to make both parties coordinate their behavior toward
the efficient outcome through the choice of strict liability with either
contributory or comparative negligence as the governing standard is
also unlikely to succeed.49 Victims will exercise due care but exces-
sively raise the level of their activity. Injurers, on the other hand, are
incentivized to take the efficient precautions and regulate their activ-
ity levels optimally. As noted while examining unilateral care scena-
rios with variable activity levels, strict liability does not necessarily
induce injurers to engage in the relevant activity at an optimal degree.
Risk averse injurers, for instance, would tend to lower their activities
below the efficient level.
All this suggests that when it comes to accidents, the expectable
cost of which can be reduced through measures taken by both injurers
and victims, there is no standard of liability capable of inducing all
parties involved to generate the efficient outcome by undertaking cost-
justified precautions and optimizing their activity levels.50 Strict lia-
bility tends to reduce the levels of activity. Therefore, it is relied upon
where the reduction of activity levels is desirable.51
C. The Challenges of Regulating Levels of Activity
The determination of optimal activity levels is a daunting task.52
Obtaining information as to how much potential injurers should drive,
for instance, is particularly costly, if possible at all. It would normally
be more feasible to ascertain what the cost-justified precautions are in
such a case. For this reason, it is also extremely difficult to create neg-
46. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 212; DEVLIN, supra note 15, at 80–81.
47. COOTER & ULEN, supra note 14, at 212; MICELI, supra note 16, at 38–39; POLIN-
SKY, supra note 23, at 52–53.
48. SHAVELL, supra note 13, at 202.
49. Id. at 201–02.
50. Shavell, supra note 28, at 23.
51. COLE & GROSSMAN, supra note 3, at 301–03; POSNER, supra note 14, at 206–07
(indicating that strict liability is the appropriate means for creating optimal in-
centive structures related to levels of activity when it comes to ultrahazardous
activities); Shavell, supra note 28, at 23.
52. Shavell, supra note 28, at 22–23.
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ligence standards of due care that would reflect considerations related
to the optimality of activity levels.
Furthermore, a standard of liability might be particularly apt for
inducing the optimal degree of care to which potential injurers are
obliged without at the same time necessarily constituting the proper
standard for regulating levels of activity.53 On top of that, activity
levels themselves might be multidimensional in the sense that risky
behavior might be the result of various diverse activities that cannot
be simultaneously regulated by the adoption of a common standard.
All this suggests that the optimal strategy would in many cases
entail the adoption of a single standard of liability for inducing the
optimal amount of care and a separate standard—or even various
standards—for optimizing diverse types of activity levels.54 Ideally
courts should establish, where possible, separate standards inducing
the optimal levels for specific activities.55
III. STRICT LIABILITY AND NEGLIGENCE IN COPYRIGHT
Rather than mirroring negligence, it is submitted that the tort of
copyright infringement constitutes a “mixed” system of liability, which
relies on strict liability to generate optimal incentives for creativity
while adopting negligence standards to secure optimal activity levels
for dealings with earlier works that the copyright owner could not sup-
press without undermining the public interest.
A. The Case for Strict Liability in Copyright Law:
Generating Authorial Incentives
Copyright internalizes many of the positive externalities of crea-
tive works.56 In principle, third parties may not enjoy the utility de-
rived from a given work of authorship without the author’s consent. In
fact, copyright internalizes the benefits that authors generate for soci-
ety from the moment that their works are fixed on a tangible medium
of expression.57 The creation of such an exclusive legal position is de-
signed to bring about markets for authorial works endeavoring to in-
53. POLINSKY, supra note 23, at 50–54.
54. CENTO G. VELJANOVSKI, ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES OF LAW 197–98 (2007).
55. Cf. Stephen G. Gilles, Rule-Based Negligence and the Regulation of Activity
Levels, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 319 (1992) (arguing that the courts can rely on safety
regulations, custom, or even common general knowledge to create rules about the
reasonableness and the optimal levels of specific activities, which would then be
applied to negligence cases where it is proper to adjust activity levels in order to
minimize the expected costs of accidents; and suggesting that such proxy rules
would ameliorate the difficulties courts have in finding appropriate standards for
regulating activity levels).
56. See generally Wendy J. Gordon, Intellectual Property, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF LEGAL STUDIES 617 (Peter Cane & Mark Tushnet eds., 2005).
57. Copyright Act § 102(a), 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2012).
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centivize the production of those goods and, at the same time, allow
for their dissemination.58 And the ultimate aim is to promote the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts.59
Copyright’s challenge is to create a package of benefits that would
be sufficient for maintaining incentives to produce creative works
without internalizing those benefits that are essential to incremental
authorship and whose public use promotes the utilitarian purposes of
copyright protection. Since those benefits are not directly quantifiable
but must be determined in abstract terms, for the creative behavior of
an indefinite number of potential authors to be steered effectively cop-
yright provisions seek to devise an optimal “incentives package” by
demarcating the boundaries of intangible property with as much clar-
ity and precision as possible.60 Analogous to the law of real property,
copyright law enables authors to fence their property within some pre-
scribed limits so as to extract benefits from its exploitation.
Intangible property manifests itself when fixed in a tangible me-
dium of expression.61 However, the package of benefits meant to in-
duce the production of creative works does not include those benefits
that remain external as a consequence of copyright principles, such as
the idea/expression divide,62 the merger doctrine,63 or the exemption
from liability of independent creation.64 Further, the boundaries of
the author’s property are marked by the scope of the exclusive rights
58. Wendy J. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright: The Challenges of Con-
sistency, Consent, and Encouragement Theory, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1343, 1384–94
(1989) [hereinafter Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright].
59. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The Intellectual Property Clause grants Congress the
authority “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.” Id.; see also Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954)
(“The economic philosophy behind the clause empowering Congress to grant pat-
ents and copyrights is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by
personal gain is the best way to advance public welfare through the talents of
authors and inventors in ‘Science and useful Arts.’ Sacrificial days devoted to
such creative activities deserve rewards commensurate with the services
rendered.”).
60. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 58, at 1378–84.
61. Copyright Act § 102(a).
62. Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102–07 (1879). On the welfare losses associated
with protecting ideas in the copyright context, see William M. Landes & Richard
A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325,
347–50 (1989).
63. Herbert Rosenthal Jewelry Corp. v. Kalpakian, 446 F.2d 738, 742 (9th Cir. 1971);
Morrissey v. Procter & Gamble Co., 379 F.2d 675, 679 (1st Cir. 1967).
64. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 217–18 (“[T]wo men, each a perfectionist, independently
mak[e] maps of the same territory. Though the maps are identical each may ob-
tain the exclusive right to make copies of his own particular map, and yet neither
will infringe the other’s copyright. Likewise a copyrighted directory is not in-
fringed by a similar directory which is the product of independent work.”).
398 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:384
that the copyright owner is entitled to assert.65 Trespass upon prop-
erty does not simply transpire as a result of third parties having some-
how dealt with a copyrighted work. It does so only when that work has
actually been used in a particular manner. Impermissible uses include
the unauthorized reproduction, distribution, public performance, and
display of a work of authorship as well as its use for the preparation of
derivative works.66 The certainty as to the legal status of an exploita-
ble resource that can be transferred in exchange for an economic bene-
fit would facilitate the emergence of those markets where the rights
holder could seek rents.67 It is envisaged that the effectuation of such
transactions will eventually put works of authorship at their most effi-
cient use. A property rule is necessary for enabling works of author-
ship to be transferred in voluntary transactions.
Property rules aim at the reallocation of resources in a manner
that maximizes economic value. For a resource to end up in the hands
of those who value it the most through private bargaining, it must be
subjected to the individual control of the owner, who determines the
conditions under which third parties may deal with the intangible as-
set.68 Strict liability is a necessary component of this structure. A neg-
65. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 58, at 1382–83.
66. Copyright Act § 106. The impermissible uses are formulated in an abstract man-
ner, reflecting a reliance on proxies to measure valuable attributes of the subject
matter and a decision to internalize benefits through a property right. With such
a large class of uses bundled together to the benefit of authors, it is sensible to
conclude that the law basically regulates the access to a resource. On those is-
sues, see Henry E. Smith, Exclusion Versus Governance: Two Strategies for De-
lineating Property Rights, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 453, 467–71 (2002).
67. On this aspect of the exclusion strategy see generally Thomas W. Merrill &
Henry E. Smith, The Property/Contract Interface, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 773,
793–96 (2001) (arguing that highly standardized in rem rights, which rely on
crude proxies, facilitate transactions by reducing any potential buyer’s cost of ob-
taining information about the scope of rights he or she may acquire).
68. ROBERT P. MERGES, JUSTIFYING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 5 (2011) (arguing that
individual control is an appropriate means for administrating intangible assets
and makes sense from a policy perspective as much as property rights for tangi-
ble property do). While the intangible nature of the asset could not be taken to
suggest that IP rights should not be designed as property rights, it may indeed
indicate that, in the case of copyright, the scope of permissible third party uses
would be broader than the one available to those wishing to deal with tangible
products owned by another. This is primarily because works of authorship are
non-rivalrous in consumption. As such, they are capable of being used extensively
without losing their value. The constitutionally mandated policy of promoting the
progress of science and the useful arts through the grant of exclusive rights to
authors in their writings presupposes that a significant number of dealings with
copyrighted works, such as criticism and commentary, should be permitted dur-
ing the copyright term. On this issue, see Wendy J. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright
Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction, 122 HARV. L. REV. F. 62, 67 (2009)
[hereinafter Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinc-
tion] (making the point that “unlike land, a decentralized use of copyrighted work
is unlikely to result in a tragedy of the commons and more likely to suffer from a
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ligence rule would allow third parties to circumvent the market,
reducing the efficiency of the owner’s coordination.
Finally, an abstract norm such as the one holding defendants liable
for trespass upon copyright property is more likely to create correct
incentives because the behavioral guideline provided by such a norm
is clearer and addresses the widest possible circle of individuals.69
Generalized prescriptions are apt for creating rights in rem.70 Moreo-
ver, rules are capable of promoting the type of individualism fostered
by copyright laws because they allow the formation of strategies that
promote self-interest and prevent the adjudicator from undermining
the effect of actions undertaken at a later stage.71
Importantly, the exclusive legal position associated with copyright
confers upon the rights holder a profit-maximizing opportunity. Copy-
right demarcates intangible property so that the rights holder could
prevent third parties from trespassing therein, regardless of whether
he or she is able to establish economic harm such as loss of sales or
potential profit as a result of the infringing act. Apparently, strict lia-
bility ensures that the copyright owner is capable of internalizing the
full market value ascribed to that functionally delineated piece of
tragedy of the anticommons” and therefore explaining that copyright law has a
broader “necessity” privilege than the tort of trespass to land and involves more
of those “harmless but beneficial uses by third parties” than real property law).
Gordon then wonders whether some of our behavioral traits might affect the ca-
pacity of the market mechanism to “correct for” the misallocation of rights in
works of authorship. Id. at 73. Assuming that people are less motivated to cap-
ture benefits than to avoid losing possession, copyright owners might in fact be
reluctant to license socially desirable uses of their works. Id. This “endowment
effect” might be stronger when it comes to goods that we have created ourselves,
as she suggests. Id. at 70. But, on the other hand, irrational loss aversion may be
counteracted by overconfidence about the financial returns of investments, which
characterizes us as well. Id. at 72. In turn, this overconfidence may result in ex-
cessive royalties. Id. In other words, Gordon suggests that it may well be the case
that copyright owners are not as good as owners of tangible products in maximiz-
ing the social value of their property. Id.
69. On this particular point, see Louis T. Vischer, Justifications and Excuses in the
Economic Analysis of Tort Law, in ECONOMIC TORTS 22 (Sabiha P. Khanum ed.,
2009). On the correlation between norm specificity and deterrence, see Isaac Ehr-
lich & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Legal Rulemaking, 3 J. LEGAL
STUD. 257, 275–77 (1974).
70. Anthony I. Ogus, Quantitative Rules and Judicial Decision Making, in THE ECO-
NOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 210–11 (Paul Burrows & Cento Veljanovski eds., 1981)
(noting that disputes between individuals arising from property are more likely
to be resolved under rules that feature a high degree of generality).
71. Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L.
REV. 1685, 1740–51 (1976) (noting that this non-interventionist approach marks
the correspondence between rules and individualism). Depending on context,
rules may suppress individualism since they disfavor arguments pertaining to
the situation of an individual. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A
PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF RULE-BASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN
LIFE 162–63 (1991).
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property in accordance with the aim of spurring the production of ex-
pressive works and the ultimate utilitarian purposes of copyright law.
To facilitate the unfettered exploitation of the internalized bene-
fits, copyright law dispenses with the necessity of proving actual copy-
ing.72 Were the rights holder required to meet such a complex and
often unattainable evidentiary burden, the low probability of suc-
ceeding in litigation would undermine copyright’s incentive function,
if not eradicate it altogether. As a rule, defendants would be exposed
to liability for infringing acts if the copyright owner is able to show
that those third parties have had an opportunity to copy the protected
work and there is a substantial degree of resemblance between the
two works involved.73 Moreover, in some cases of striking similarity,
the plaintiff would even be discharged from the burden of establishing
that the defendant had indeed accessed the copyrighted work.74 The
requirement of substantial similarity is there to clarify whether there
has been a trespass because it delineates the contours of copyright
property.75 It seeks to ascertain whether the defendant has appropri-
ated copyrightable expression.
Further insight could be gained if one views copyright legislation
as the result of a bargain between authors and the state, necessitated
72. Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2d Cir. 1936) (“With so
many sources before them they might quite honestly forget what they took; no-
body knows the origin of his inventions; memory and fancy merge even in adults.
Yet unconscious plagiarism is actionable quite as much as deliberate.”). See gen-
erally GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 9.2.1; MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 4
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.01[B]; PATRY, supra note 7, § 9:21.
73. Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Supp. 177, 180–81
(S.D.N.Y. 1976).
74. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468–69 (2d Cir. 1946).
75. Cf. Gordon, Copyright as Tort Law’s Mirror Image, supra note 2, at 457–65 (con-
sidering the requirement of substantial similarity as a principal difference be-
tween the tort of trespass to land and the tort of copyright infringement;
explaining that copyright infringement does not mirror trespass to land because
it imposes a requirement additional to the one of entry; expressing the view that
this requirement manifests the idea of copyright infringement being structured
as a tort based on negligence because it is the substantial similarity between the
two works that makes harm likely to occur; and suggesting that improper appro-
priation reflects a fault standard, which differs in nature from strict liability).
Without denying the correlation between substantial similarity and harm, or
even fault, it seems to me that the inclusion of that requirement into the tort of
copyright infringement is rather primarily associated with the particularities of
demarcating intangible as opposed to physical property. Copyright law requires
the plaintiff to show proof of access and similarity to avoid frivolous litigation
given that he or she is relieved from the burden of proving actual copying. Apart
from that, access and similarity are issues that the plaintiff can prove at a lower
cost. On these issues, see Thomas R. Lee, Pleading and Proof: The Economics of
Legal Burdens, 1997 BYU L. REV. 1, 19–20 (1997).
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by the nature of intangible property as a public good.76 In order to
encourage reliance investments in the production and dissemination
of works of authorship, the state offers a consideration in the form of a
guaranteed profit-maximizing opportunity.77
Strict liability is, therefore, an indispensable feature of copyright
protection as it secures the internalization of a set of benefits that are
predetermined by reference to the potential market value of a given
subject matter and whose prospect operates as an incentive for autho-
rial activity.
B. The Case for Negligence in Copyright Law: Fair Use as
Regulation of Activity Levels
While strict liability is indispensable for the internalization of ben-
efits that are adequate to induce the production of expressive works, it
also tends at the same time to curb the levels of socially desirable ac-
tivity, as noted above. This begs the question of what could be consid-
ered as an activity level in the copyright context. Any socially
desirable activity that is likely to be suppressed by copyright protec-
tion based on strict liability should count as an activity whose level
has to be regulated by copyright law. Traditional copyright policy con-
siderations, such as the concern to avoid the inhibition to incremental
authorship or the restriction to the freedom of speech, belong with the
circle of activities that have to be regulated through recourse to some
negligence standard. In section 107 of the Copyright Act, Congress has
explicitly provided for activities that should, at least to some extent,
remain free from copyright constraints.78 Accordingly, activities such
as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple
76. For an invocation and application of this theory, see Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S.
186 (2003).
77. See Robert P. Merges, A Few Kind Words for Absolute Infringement Liability in
Patent Law, 31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1, 44 (2016) (considering strict liability in
copyright with reference to interdisciplinary literature in support of the proposi-
tion that inadvertent plagiarism does occur, while highlighting the merits of pat-
ent law’s absolute liability rule and explaining its reliance function). As a
principle for demarcating the boundaries of copyright property, the concept of
inadvertent plagiarism has, of course, its weaknesses. In an environment where
communications media are omnipresent, it may become too easy for the copyright
owner to interfere with the creative efforts of others. See Wendy J. Gordon, To-
ward a Jurisprudence of Benefits: The Norms of Copyright and the Problem of
Private Censorship, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 1009, 1031 (1990). Despite those weak-
nesses, it does not seem as if the contemporary principles of copyright infringe-
ment could be abandoned, much like patent law’s rule of absolute liability cannot
be discarded. For copyright to be able to develop its function of internalizing ben-
efits to secure authorial incentives, such evidentiary easements are necessary.
On the capacity of rules, as opposed to standards, to encourage reliance, see
SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 137–45.
78. Copyright Act § 107, 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2012).
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copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research must be regulated
separately so as to ensure the freedom of third parties to engage in
them at an optimal level. All six favored uses that are explicitly men-
tioned in the statute share the common characteristic of referring to
potentially permissible dealings with copyrights which furnish social
benefits that outweigh the social losses resulting from the inability of
the copyright owners to enforce their rights.79
However, it is impossible for the legislator either to predict all pos-
sible types of activity that need separate regulation or to set the ap-
propriate level of care with regard to the copyright owner’s interests
that those engaging in such activities must exercise. The legislator
who passes a copyright statute cannot possibly possess the informa-
tion necessary to construct universal negligence standards. As a result
thereof, that duty is left to the courts, which will eventually collect
that information, mainly from the parties to the dispute.
But section 107 of the Copyright Act clearly prescribes the legal
framework that courts have to abide by.80 Firstly, the relevant activ-
ity is defined.81 Then, the courts apply the fair use doctrine to deter-
mine the optimal level of that activity and introduce the level of care
that third parties must exercise toward the copyright owner’s legiti-
mate interests.82 Thus, in the case of copyright, activity levels are de-
fined exogenously83 and subjected to negligence standards in order to
maximize dealings with earlier works that serve copyright’s policies.
79. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 12.2.1 at 12:13–12:14. Cf. MARSHALL A. LEAFFER, UN-
DERSTANDING COPYRIGHT LAW 498 (6th ed. 2014) (arguing that the common theme
to the foreseen uses mentioned in the preamble is that they are all productive
uses, each one contributing its own “valuable creative element”).
80. SHELDON W. HALPERN, COPYRIGHT LAW—PROTECTION OF ORIGINAL EXPRESSION
615 (3d ed. 2016) (explaining that the statute suggests a bifurcated analysis,
which first examines whether a given use belongs to a broader category of uses
that are generally deemed fair in light of their purpose and then proceeds to as-
sess whether that specific use should be insulated from liability after weighing
the four factors).
81. An exclusion strategy is often coupled with governance rules that regulate use of
the resource by third parties. Property rights usually combine exclusion with
some element of governance strategy. Governance rules focus on specific uses/
activities. See Smith, supra note 66, at 455 (elaborating upon the work of Harold
Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967)).
82. In order to define the type of activity implicated in a given dispute, the courts
must engage in an analysis of the four factors and in particular, the first factor.
See Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (rejecting
the fair use assessment of the district court, which considered that the defend-
ants could not rely on the defense without analyzing the four factors because
their news clipping business involved a type of use of earlier copyrighted works
that was not comparable to those mentioned in the preamble of section 107 of the
Copyright Act).
83. On this approach and its alternatives, see generally Nuno Garoupa & Thomas S.
Ulen, The Economics of Activity Levels in Tort Liability and Regulation, in RE-
SEARCH HANDBOOK ON ECONOMIC MODELS OF LAW 33, 41–42 (Thomas J. Miceli &
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The first factor, focusing on the purpose and the character of the
use, facilitates the emergence of negligence standards for specific ac-
tivities in copyright law in that it prompts the courts to define the type
of activity that may qualify for a fair use exemption in light of the
social benefits associated with it. Transformative uses, such as paro-
dies, that appropriate material from a copyrighted work but add new
expression and new meaning enrich our understanding of the cur-
rently available literary and artistic goods. Under a strict liability re-
gime, the levels of parodic activity would obviously be suboptimal.
Once the type of the relevant activity has been ascertained, the opti-
mal levels of that activity are induced by setting standards as to the
qualitative or quantitative nature of the material defendants are per-
mitted to copy (second and third factors). The most important implica-
tion of the negligence standard is that the copyright owner might be
deprived of some of the benefits that would have been internalized
under a regime solely based on strict liability (fourth factor).
This observation explains, in my view, two phenomena already
highlighted by copyright scholarship. First, courts tend at times to
“stampede” the factor analysis and would rather hold the defense of
fair use applicable whenever they consider that the allegedly infring-
ing act should be exempted from liability.84 Rather than arguing that
the factors are quasi manipulated so as to correspond with the out-
come of the legal evaluation, one could say that the analysis of factors
is simply indicative of the activity levels and the standard of care that
the court deems appropriate in a given case. Second, the fair use doc-
trine is only seemingly indeterminate and despite its flexibility in re-
quiring a case-by-case analysis, there is actually a considerable degree
Matthew J. Baker eds., 2014). It is not always easy to distinguish between what
amounts to a measure of exercising due care and what constitutes an activity
level since the latter may also be perceived as a means of precaution. The initial
insight was that activity levels simply refer to the frequency with which an activ-
ity takes place. Levels of activity are more difficult to measure. Furthermore, the
standard applicable to the most straightforward dimensions of care may be
suboptimal for activity levels. For those reasons, activity levels would often be
regulated separately (exogenously). After reviewing the relevant literature,
Garoupa and Ulen observe that this distinction is to a large extent artificial. Id.
Distinguishing between care and activity levels becomes a matter of adopting op-
timal standards for a set of disputes featuring common elements.
84. David Nimmer, “Fairest of Them All” and Other Fairy Tales of Fair Use, 66 LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS. 263, 278–84 (2003). Cf. Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of
U.S. Copyright Fair Use Opinions, 1978–2005, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 549 (2008)
(bringing forward empirical evidence suggesting that “stampeding” is not a gen-
eralized phenomenon); Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1260
(11th Cir. 2014) (“Accordingly, we find that the District Court erred in giving
each of the four factors equal weight, and in treating the four factors as a simple
mathematical formula. As we will explain, because of the circumstances of this
case, some of the factors weigh more heavily on the fair use determination than
others.”).
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of certainty as to the uses that qualify as fair within the meaning of
section 107 of the Copyright Act.85 Copyright scholars have traced the
patterns governing the judicial administration of the fair use doctrine
in the consistent treatment of identified types of secondary uses and
provided a taxonomy of putative fair uses.86 Some “policy-relevant”
clusters have been identified, which broadly circumscribe the types of
dealings with copyrighted works that are privileged.87 It is submitted
that this taxonomy emerges from the courts’ more or less unconscious
predisposition to apply the fair use defense by inquiring upon the de-
sirability of a given secondary use and examining whether the defen-
dant has exercised due care toward the legitimate interests of the
copyright owner after taking into account the optimal levels of
activity.
IV. LEGAL NATURE OF FAIR USE AS
A NEGLIGENCE STANDARD
A. Why Combine Strict Liability with Negligence?
Apparently, the obligation of third parties to refrain from infring-
ing earlier copyrights and their privilege to engage in uses that pro-
mote the broader utilitarian purposes of copyright law cannot be
subjected to the same standard of care. Strict liability would ade-
85. Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2537, 2539–44
(2009); Jonathan Griffiths, Unsticking the Centre-Piece – the Liberation of Euro-
pean Copyright Law?, 1 J. INTELL. PROP. INFO. TECH. & ELEC. COMM. L. 87, 90–91
(2010) (criticizing the European reluctance to allow for more flexibility by adopt-
ing the fair use model on the grounds of a perceived conviction that the doctrine
is unpredictable).
86. Paul Goldstein, Fair Use in Context, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 433, 442–43 (2008)
(noting that while the importance of taxonomizing fair uses should be appreci-
ated, regard must also be had to the dynamic nature of fair use analysis, which
may lead to known secondary uses being assessed differently after considering
technological or other market changes). Other attempts to unveil the regularities
marionetting the application of the fair use defense include: Michael J. Madison,
A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1525, 1623–87
(2004) (favoring an interdisciplinary approach to fair use whereby the legality of
defendant’s actions would be assessed for conforming with recognized social or
cultural patterns); Matthew Sag, Predicting Fair Use, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 47 (2012)
(seeking to identify fact-patterns affecting fair use outcomes).
87. Samuelson, supra note 85. This rulification of fair use has an important advan-
tage. See Niva Elkin-Koren & Orit Fischman-Afori, Rulifying Fair Use, 59 ARIZ.
L. REV. 161 (2017). To some desirable extent it turns fair use to a “class defense”
as opposed to an “individualized defense” in the sense that these terms are used
by Parchomovsky and Stein, who note that parodists, for instance, have created a
harbor for everyone belonging to the same class with them and did not simply
escape liability for their own benefit. Gideon Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Intel-
lectual Property Defenses, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1483, 1531 (2013). Parchomovsky
and Stein explore ways to empower defendants relying upon “class defenses.” Id.
at 1483–1542.
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quately secure creative incentives for authors, but it would suppress
socially desirable activities. Negligence would maximize otherwise de-
sirable activities, but it would reduce authorial incentives. Hence, cop-
yright law has adopted a mixed system of liability. The tort of
copyright infringement is designed to mirror trespass involving an in-
terference with an individual’s subjective right, which can be enforced
against everyone. Such an abstract and general prohibition coordi-
nates societal behavior to promote a climate in which copyright is
respected so that authorial incentives are effectively secured.88 At the
same time, it is necessary to provide exceptions on a case-by-case basis
since the utilitarian purposes of copyright suggest that a certain
amount of dealings with earlier works should be permissible.89
The structure of the assessment reflects a type of decision making
that has been referred to as “rule-sensitive particularism.”90 Decision-
makers may deviate from the rule to accommodate the particularities
of a specific case by considering account all relevant factors but are
required at the same time to take into account the value of having a
rule. Negligence standards, on the other hand, are suitable for opti-
mizing the levels of socially desirable activities. Hence, the tort of cop-
yright infringement constitutes a mixed system for distributing
88. The effectiveness of any IP system depends not solely on the application of its
legal rules but also on the observance of corresponding social norms, which would
ideally deter the infringement of IP rights even in those cases where the law is
inefficient because, for instance, rights are difficult to enforce. See, e.g., Lior
Strahilevitz, Charismatic Code, Social Norms, and the Emergence of Cooperation
on the File-Sharing Networks, 89 VA. L. REV. 505 (2003) (discussing the problem
in the context of file-sharing). For norms to be internalized by the individuals,
they must somehow reflect a more or less unanimous consensus that the infring-
ing conduct is undesirable. See generally Robert D. Cooter, Structural Adjudica-
tion and the New Law Merchant: A Model of Decentralized Law, 14 INT’L. REV. L.
& ECON. 215, 224 (1994) (discussing the evolution and efficiency of social norms
and providing an analytical framework for assessing whether a social norm
should be elevated to the level of law). This is more likely to happen when norms
are characterized by a high degree of abstractness and generality because it is
that type of norm that effectively commands immediate unanimous agreement.
See Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 383 (1997). In that regard, one could see at least some sense in
drawing the parallels between the infringement of intellectual property rights
and the concept of theft. This approach allows the emergence of esteem-based
norms, which would eventually be internalized if individuals prefer to avoid
shaming and disapproval than getting the benefit associated with non-compli-
ance. A sense of guilt or shame is capable of leading to norm internalization. See
Richard A. Posner, Social Norms and the Law: An Economic Approach, 87 AM.
ECON. REV. 365, 366 (1997); see also SCHAUER, supra note 71, at 42–43 (discussing
the entrenchment of generalizations as a psychological phenomenon).
89. Hence, copyright law combines an exclusion strategy with governance principles.
On this point, see Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating
Entitlements in Information, 117 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 87 (2007) (discussing
fair use).
90. Schauer, supra note 12.
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liability that resorts to both strict liability and negligence to optimize
duties of care and activity levels. Fair use adjudications eventually
lead to the creation of negligence standards regulating activity levels.
The statutory language, which defines the rights of the copyright
owner by designating the infringing acts in section 106 and then sepa-
rately proceeding to prescribe fair use as a non-infringing dealing with
an earlier work in section 107, comports with the view that the Copy-
right Act has established a mixed system of liability involving two in-
dependent standards.
B. Further Reasons Behind the Choice of the Test
Let’s now turn to further explore the basis of liability and examine
its nature.91 Seeking to optimize third parties’ activity levels, the fair
use doctrine relies on a negligence standard. Accordingly, the starting
point of liability is based on the premise that the victim (copyright
owner) should bear the loss unless the injurer (secondary user) fails
the chosen test. Injurers are in a better position to decide what pre-
cautionary measures must be taken since they are the ones who have
an interest in dealing with an earlier work.
Negligence is the proper standard because strict liability tends to
reduce activity levels, which is not desirable in the case of copyright.
Fair use principles correspond to a rather flexible standard requiring
a case-by-case assessment. Such flexibility is absolutely necessary not
only because the aggregate effects of ad hoc negligence standards are
more likely to increase social welfare but also because it allows for a
timely reconsideration of the equities involved when technological ad-
vances give rise to new markets for authorial works and, at the same
time, create enhanced opportunities for consumers to access copy-
righted material. Reprography, for instance, allowed the copyright
owner to seek rents by charging for some of the newly possible secon-
dary uses involving the photocopying of a literary work. Consumers,
on the other hand, got the benefit of easier access to those works or
became able to better enjoy their own lawfully acquired copies of an
original work. When assessing the fairness of a new use, courts bear
in mind that copyright enforcement should refrain from suppressing
91. For an analysis of the considerations underlying the choice of tests for tortious
liability, see the observations of Guido Calabresi & Alvin K. Klevorick, Four Tests
for Liability in Torts, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1985).
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new technologies.92 For all those reasons, fair use had to be designed
as a flexible standard and not as a rigid rule.93
In principle, fair use operates as an ex post negligence standard.
Whether the defendant could have predicted what the requisite level
of care was at the time the action was taken is irrelevant. Rather, fair
use focuses on whether, in light of information available at the time
the dispute is adjudicated, the specific secondary use is socially benefi-
cial overall. The assessment aims at determining the result of a cost-
benefit analysis that should have taken place before the allegedly in-
fringing act. This has a further important implication. Foreseeability
is not a determinative element of the tort but only a relevant factor.94
Thus, the fair use calculus mirrors the flexible but structured “balanc-
92. PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY – FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL
JUKEBOX 19–71 (2d ed. 2003) (explaining how the encounters between copyright
and new technologies raise questions about the qualification of a secondary use
as part of the author’s or the user’s rights and the implications that such deci-
sions may have upon technological developments). As Shavell, supra note 28, at
23, suggests, the negligence standard should consider the appropriate level of
investment incurred by third parties to develop innovative products.
93. On the distinction between rules and standards, see Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus
Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 585–86 (1992) (suggesting
that promulgating standards instead of rules would be more efficient when the
information necessary for determining the content of the law is easier to obtain at
the time the defendants act or the disputes are being adjudicated).
94. STEPHEN J. SPURR, ECONOMIC FOUNDATIONS OF LAW 150–51 (2d ed. 2010) (noting
that the element of foreseeability can be included into the calculus of the
“Learned Hand Rule”). Scholars who view the tort of copyright infringement as a
system of liability mirroring negligence suggest that the introduction of a foresee-
ability requirement would bring copyright law in alignment with its tort law
moorings by confining copyright owners to redress for foreseeable harms arising
from interference with core markets or markets that are likely to be developed
and whose prospect materially affects an ex ante decision to create a work of au-
thorship. See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Foreseeability and Copyright Incentives,
122 HARV. L. REV. 1569 (2009) (arguing that a requirement of “foreseeable copy-
ing” would keep the scope of copyright protection to the level that is actually nec-
essary for creative works to emerge); see also Christina Bohannan, Copyright
Harm, Foreseeability, and Fair Use, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 969 (2007) (arguing in
favor of a harm-based approach under which harm should be inferred from fore-
seeable uses while proof of harm should be required for less foreseeable ones). In
any event, as a factor of a broader balancing test, the fact that a secondary use
was not foreseeable may indicate that the defendant has been able to come up
with a very innovative contribution such as making new forms of research possi-
ble. See, e.g., Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202 (2d Cir. 2015). For those
wishing to confine the copyright owner to the rents available in foreseeable mar-
kets, a way of getting around such doctrinal obstacles is to structure the tort of
copyright infringement as a tort of interference with a market prospect protecting
an author’s “objectively reasonable expectations” without satisfying any “purely
subjective desire for a windfall.” See Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Copyright as
Market Prospect, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 443, 487 (2018).
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ing-approach” of general tort law95 in that it implements the incen-
tives-access paradigm.
At first glance, it seems that ex post negligence standards are ill-
equipped to facilitate future decisions. If the outcome depends on what
will later be deemed reasonable with the advantage of hindsight, third
parties would then have to act on the basis of uninformed decisions.
On the other hand, an ex post standard would create incentives for the
secondary users to gather information about the requisite level of
care. And in any event, due to the unceasing and ubiquitous nature of
everyday dealings with earlier copyrights, courts have numerous op-
portunities to apply the fair use doctrine and gather a wealth of infor-
mation about precautionary measures that need to be taken once
somebody decides to use copyrighted material for a legitimate pur-
pose. It is also the nature of copyright disputes such that in the over-
whelming majority of cases it is relatively easy for the court to assess
the optimal levels of care with some help from earlier case law, cus-
tom,96 and evidence adduced by the parties to the dispute.97
Fair use is an affirmative defense placing the burden of proof on
the defendant.98 In that regard, a distinction should be drawn be-
tween the burden of persuasion and the burden of production.99 First
of all, it should be noted that it makes sense for the defendant to bear
the burden of persuasion. If not, there is the danger of the plaintiff not
being able to capture the full value of his or her work if forced to face
weak or even frivolous defenses that would coerce him or her to settle
disputes.100 Furthermore, it would undermine the effectiveness of the
95. See generally 1 DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW
OF TORTS § 161 (2d ed. 2011).
96. Custom cannot be determinative because in that case, defendants would have
had an incentive to stick with customary precautions and avoid taking useful
risks that might be necessary for innovation to emerge. On this point, see Gideon
Parchomovsky & Alex Stein, Torts and Innovation, 107 MICH. L. REV. 285 (2008).
97. There are, of course, cases such as of file sharing, where obtaining the informa-
tion necessary for an assessment of market harm as a result of the secondary use
would be anything but easy. See generally Stan J. Liebowitz, Back to the Future:
Can Copyright Owners Appropriate Revenues in the Face of New Copying Tech-
nologies?, in THE ECONOMICS OF COPYRIGHT: DEVELOPMENTS IN RESEARCH AND
ANALYSIS 1 (2003) [hereinafter Liebowitz, Back to the Future]. Nevertheless, the
courts have managed to come up with sensible decisions in this field. See Sony
Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984); Recording In-
dus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072 (9th Cir.
1999).
98. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 561 (1985); see
generally WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON FAIR USE § 2:5.
99. See generally LINDA J. SILBERMAN, ALLEN R. STEIN & TOBIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF,
CIVIL PROCEDURE – THEORY AND PRACTICE 9–10 (3d ed. 2009); CHRISTOPHER B.
MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRIC, EVIDENCE § 3.1, at 126–27 (1995).
100. On this function of the burden of proof, see Parchomovsky & Stein, supra note 96,
at 1531.
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plaintiff’s rights if he or she is made to establish the absence of any
illegality, including the unfairness of the secondary use.101 Since
there are many types of dealings—more than encountered in real
property law102—with an earlier work that are in principle socially
desirable, copyright law tends to exempt from liability a greater
amount of secondary uses than property law does. Many of those ac-
tivities, if carried out excessively, would annihilate copyright policy
where the secondary use disproportionally interferes with the eco-
nomic interests of the copyright owner. Placing the burden of persua-
sion on the plaintiff would reduce the potency of the property right as
it would render it difficult to defend in practice against a multitude of
trespassers.103
As far as the burden of production is concerned, it is an issue that
primarily relates to the need to economize on costs of evidence produc-
tion. Affirmative defenses are normally relied upon to place the bur-
den of production on the defendant when he or she can adduce
evidence at a lower cost.104 An advantage of the affirmative defense
doctrine is that it draws a distinction between issues that arise less
frequently in litigation (fair use) and issues that always arise (prima
facie case). Shifting the burden of proof to the defendant (requiring
him or her to produce evidence indicating that the secondary use is
fair) saves the cost associated with raising the less frequent issues in
all cases by the plaintiff.105 Furthermore, the fact that defendants
must plead affirmative defenses offers the benefit of narrowing down
the scope of the issues that will eventually be adjudicated.106 By rais-
ing one specific issue related to fair use or another defense, the defen-
dant provides a signal to the plaintiff and the court about the specific
issue that is going to be disputed. This narrows the scope of litigation
and avoids the unnecessary procedural costs of assessing broader
claims.
While the burden of proof, which includes both the burden of pro-
duction and the burden of persuasion, rests with the defendant, courts
may modify this principle with respect to the burden of production in
101. Cf. POSNER, supra note 14, at 845 (explaining the rationale behind shifting the
burden of proof to the defendant through affirmative defenses).
102. Gordon, Trespass-Copyright Parallels and the Harm-Benefit Distinction, supra
note 68, at 67.
103. Cf. Thomas Cotter, The Precompetitive Interest in Intellectual Property Law, 48
WM. & MARY L. REV. 483, 551 (2006) (drawing a parallel between the antitrust
plaintiff and the IP defendant who relies on the affirmative defense of fair use
and arguing that placing the burden of persuasion on the IP defendant is desira-
ble when false positives must be avoided and a reduction of the cost for protecting
the property right is desirable).
104. See generally Bruce L. Hay & Kathryn E. Spier, Burdens of Proof in Civil Litiga-
tion: An Economic Perspective, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 413, 427–28 (1997).
105. Lee, supra note 75, at 7.
106. Id. at 8.
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order to efficiently allocate the cost of producing evidence. Plaintiffs
could be called upon to establish, for instance, that a well-established
system for the licensing of excerpts from copyrighted works is in place,
even though it is the defendant who has to bear the ultimate burden of
persuasion.107 Those are instances where the plaintiff can be more ef-
ficient in providing the court with the necessary information.
The above considerations indicate that the nature of the fair use
doctrine as an affirmative defense is dictated by the very purpose of
copyright protection,108 which is to safeguard the author’s property
rights and allow access to authorial works with respect to some uses
when the social benefit of their externalization is high enough to
overcompensate the loss in authorial incentives that results from an
inability to enforce copyright.109
107. Cambridge Univ. Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232, 1279–80 (11th Cir. 2014). It also
serves as a means to economize procedural costs. The judge has authority to de-
cide a case without jury consideration when the production burden is not met. See
CHARLES TILFORD MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 336, at 569 (John Wil-
liam Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992); 9 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT
COMMON LAW § 2487, at 299 (3d ed. 1983). It is beyond the scope of this Article to
further examine the possible economic or procedural rationales behind the initial
allocation of the shifting burden of production in the context of the fair use analy-
sis. Factors such as the incentives of the copyright owners and users to gather
and reveal information about the risk should be relevant. Another issue that lies
beyond the scope of this Article is the possible effect of the allocation of a specific
persuasion burden on the activity levels, which may be an issue that could also be
examined from an empirical perspective. For a general account of the burden of
proof as a policy instrument that may be relied upon to regulate activity levels,
see Louis Kaplow, On the Optimal Burden of Proof, 119 J. POL. ECON. 1104
(2011).
108. Thus, substantive copyright law entails assumptions about the procedural rules
that are appropriate for implementing its policies. See Thomas O. Main, The Pro-
cedural Foundation of Substantive Law, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 801 (2010) (arguing
that substantive law rules are at least to some extent inherently procedural in
the sense that their content often suggests optimal procedural rules for their
enforcement).
109. Critics of the affirmative defense doctrine and its application in the field of copy-
right law argue that placing the burden of proof on the defendant is problematic
for uses that involve the freedom of speech as it requires “the speaker to prove an
entitlement to speak.” Lydia Pallas Loren, Fair Use: An Affirmative Defense?, 90
WASH. L. REV. 685, 709 (2015) (examining arguments related to the wording of
the statute and the legislative history to support the view that fair use should not
be treated as an affirmative defense). Quite a few scholars share this view. See
Ned Snow, Proving Fair Use: Burden of Proof as Burden of Speech, 31 CARDOZO L.
REV. 1781 (2010). It seems, however, that the fair use doctrine is capable of ac-
commodating those concerns through its rulification. Fair use adjudication has
increased the predictability of the fair use doctrine providing defendants with
robust precedents that could effectively be invoked to protect their freedom of
speech in front of sensible judges. Concluding on an issue that cannot be dis-
cussed any further on this day, an additional argument that could be brought
forward in favor of the proposition that fair use is an affirmative defense can be
derived from the language of the statute, which uses a negative expression to
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In the context of fair use analysis, it is therefore possible to enjoy
the virtues of negligence and avoid a great deal of its drawbacks. An-
other advantage of negligence that copyright law embraces is the abil-
ity to optimize levels of activity by personalizing the standard of
care.110 Everyone can thereby do their possible best, so to say, to en-
gage in activities that promote the goals of copyright.111 An appropria-
tion artist, for instance, may enjoy broad leeway in dealing with an
earlier work112 whereas someone who photocopies journal articles for
profit would be subjected to more restrictive duties of care.113 Eventu-
ally, fair use seeks to efficiently personalize the levels of care by creat-
ing standards that are applicable either to the particular defendant or
to specific groups of individuals such as news reporters.
Thus, in practice, the fair use doctrine would often operate as an ex
ante negligence standard.114 Notwithstanding the constructive criti-
clarify that fair use does not amount to an infringing act. Traditionally, the plain-
tiff is required to prove affirmative claims on the grounds of negative averments
being more difficult to establish. This suggestion does not hold true in every case
and it could be criticized from different perspectives. However, the economic jus-
tification provided above, namely that it would be inefficient to require plaintiffs
to show the absence of any limitation to their claim, indicates that there is some
reason to it. See Lee, supra note 75, at 7–10.
110. Omri Ben-Shahar & Ariel Porat, Personalizing Negligence Law, 91 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 628, 656–59 (2016). Ostensibly, strict liability seems to be superior to negli-
gence when the welfare-maximizing solution would require different groups of
potential tortfeasors to exercise different levels of care depending on their dis-
tinct cost functions. It has been suggested, though, that the same outcome could
be achieved through a negligence rule requiring the exercise of maximum care by
those tortfeasors that face lower costs of care with liability then increasing pro-
portionally to the departure of potential tortfeasors from that standard. See
Thomas J. Miceli, On Negligence Rules and Self-Selection, 2 REV. L. & ECON. 349
(2006). Thus, neither strict liability nor negligence could be in abstract terms
considered preferable in view of their decentralization effect. See generally Scha¨-
fer & Mu¨ller-Langer, supra note 27, at 24–27. As already suggested, efficient self-
selection is achieved in the field of copyright infringement through the imposition
of specific standards of care regulating activity levels that result from the fair use
analysis.
111. On the positive externalities rationale for fair use, see Thomas F. Cotter, Fair
Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1271, 1280–83 (2008) (ap-
pearing critical of the actual efficacy of the doctrine); Brett M. Frischman & Mark
A. Lemley, Spillovers, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 257, 302 (2007) (analyzing the “spil-
lover benefits” of fair uses).
112. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
113. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir.
1996).
114. This is also because the application of negligence standards tends to produce a
rich amount of publicly available information about the risk as third parties ob-
tain detailed data about how courts have calculated the optimal degree of care in
various cases. On this point, see Scha¨fer & Mu¨ller-Langer, supra note 27, at
27–29.
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cism on the doctrine being vague and unpredictable,115 it has been
possible to derive from the mass of fair use case law a substantial body
of rules that are sufficiently precise and inclusive.116 Despite its amor-
phous nature, the fair use doctrine is highly predictable. Any remain-
ing degree of uncertainty is offset by the social value obtained through
the operation of a copyright system that uses strict liability to incen-
tivize the production of authorial works while seeking to optimize ac-
tivity levels through a negligence standard. Potential losses in legal
certainty form part of the fair use calculus already.117 Precedent has
therefore transformed a pure standard into a hybrid that is still domi-
nated by “standard-like” elements while also accommodating signifi-
cant “rule-like” aspects.118
C. Copyright’s Rule of Reason
Every area of law has its own rule of reason. In the case of copy-
right,119 the core rule is intended to maximize the rent-seeking oppor-
tunities of rights holders while allowing enough breathing space for
dealings with earlier works that are capable of promoting knowledge
115. LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 187 (2004); Jessica Lit-
man, Revising Copyright Law for the Information Age, 75 OR. L. REV. 19, 45–46
(1996). Various suggestions have been made to increase the predictability of the
fair use assessment. See Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV.
1087, 1147 (2007) (proposing the creation of a “Fair Use Board” in the U.S. Copy-
right Office that would issue clearance letters exempting individual uses from
liability); Gideon Parchomovsky & Kevin A. Goldman, Fair Use Harbors, 93 VA.
L. REV. 1483 (2007) (suggesting the introduction of “safe harbors”). It has also
been argued that fair use should be adjudicated by specialist courts. See David
Nimmer, A Modest Proposal to Streamline Fair Use Determinations, 24 CARDOZO
ARTS & ENT. L.J. 11 (2006).
116. Samuelson, supra note 85, at 2421–44.
117. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 12.1, at 12.3.
118. Kaplow, supra note 93, at 561, 577–79 (explaining how legal commands may mix
rules and standards in varying degrees). He also illustrates how precedent may
transform a standard into a rule when courts end up applying the precedent in-
stead of administrating the standard. Id. at 611–16. Such complete transforma-
tion is not likely to occur in the case of fair use because the courts are anyway
obliged to assess the four factors both individually and in aggregate. It is rather
unlikely for the fair use analysis to be substituted by a long list of defenses espe-
cially given that the flexibility of the doctrine is necessary for considering techno-
logical advances when deciding cases of copyright infringement. See Schauer,
supra note 12, at 650–51. Conversely, the strict liability rule for copyright in-
fringement is standard-like only to the extent that a finding of infringement also
requires a specific form of dealing with the earlier work described in section 106
of the Copyright Act. Copyright Act § 106, 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2012).
119. H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 65 (1976); see also Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 448 (1984) (explaining the core rule of copyright law).
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and further scientific development.120 Fair use, which is an expression
of that principle,121 aims at reconciling ostensibly competing public
interests:122 the public interest in the optimal inducement of creative
works through economic benefits derived from the market and the
public interest in the “broad public availability of literature, music,
and the other arts.”123
As a starting point, the copyright owner is entitled to the maxi-
mum financial return that his or her work is likely to generate be-
cause it is only then that the copyright owner obtains the market
value of his or her creative contribution. This also allows for a more
detailed determination of the copyright owner’s economic interests,
which will eventually be balanced with the interests of the other mem-
bers of society. On the other hand, as the Second Circuit has colorfully
observed, fair use analysis requires courts to “occasionally
subordinate the copyright holder’s interest in a maximum financial
return to the greater public interest in the development of art, science
and industry.”124 Importantly, the fair use defense does not reflect a
standard whose objective lies in the achievement of static net social
welfare. The application of the fair use doctrine should not therefore
permit the usurpation of the copyright owner’s markets with the argu-
ment that in a given case, copying is socially beneficial without consid-
ering the parallel reduction in authorial incentives that the secondary
use entails.125
However, the market mechanism may not always constitute the
proper means for allocating the resource at issue either because the
secondary use is not one that should be commodified or because there
is some sort of market failure that prevents the relevant market from
optimally allocating that resource.126 High transaction costs, for in-
120. William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 HARV. L. REV.
1659, 1767 (1988). The consequentialist nature of the fair use analysis is further
discussed by Bracha & Goold, supra note 5, at 948–50, 988–92.
121. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109–10
(1990) (noting that fair use, along with the doctrines refusing to protect ideas as
opposed to their expression and excluding pure facts from protection, stem from
the same underlying rule).
122. Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure: Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975, 981, 999 (2002).
123. Sony Corp. of Am., 464 U.S. at 432.
124. Berlin v. E.C. Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 544 (2d Cir. 1964).
125. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., 99 F.3d 1381, 1391 (6th Cir.
1996) (rejecting a copy shop owner’s argument that the social benefit derived
from its copying of course materials for students and professors trumped the pub-
lishers’ loss of licensing revenue and noting that “the destruction of this revenue
stream can only have a deleterious effect upon the incentive to publish academic
writings”).
126. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analy-
sis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982)
[hereinafter Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure] (noting that a number of socia-
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stance, may prevent bargains that would have otherwise taken place
under normal conditions. On the other hand, the right to write a criti-
cal review of someone else’s book, for instance, is a use that should not
be commodified in principle, given that the copyright owner would
tend to refuse a license to avoid undesirable criticism, especially when
his or her “priceless” reputation or esteem is at stake, thereby thwart-
ing the transfer of the entitlement to its highest-valued user.127
For the mixed system of liability to operate effectively toward the
implementation of the constitutional mandate, the two standards
bly desirable secondary uses would be exempted from liability due to the impossi-
bility of reaching bargains). Drawing upon the categorical distinction between
excuses and justifications in tort law, Gordon then distinguishes between excused
and justified fair uses. Excused uses refer to situations where the market mecha-
nism allows for the welfare-maximizing outcome to emerge but due to the lack of
favorable market conditions as it may happen, for instance, in the case of high
transaction-costs, bargaining does not eventually take place (market malfunc-
tion). Fair use may be denied if this would significantly harm the plaintiff’s eco-
nomic interests. Furthermore, fair use would normally disappear once the
relevant market failure is remedied. See, e.g., Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United
States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d, 420 U.S. 376 (1975). Justified uses
refer to situations where markets could not be relied upon to achieve the social
optimum (market limitation). Critical and parodic uses of earlier works consti-
tute representative examples of justified uses since the copyright owner might
wish to suppress the critical review of his or her works. The same applies to non-
monetizable interests and other non-monetary values such as teaching and schol-
arship. The copyright owner’s economic interests are more likely to influence the
outcome of the fair use calculus if market malfunction is present. See Wendy J.
Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use: Commodification and
Market Perspectives, in NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & NEIL WEINSTOCK NETANEL, THE
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 149 (P. Bernt Hugenholtz ed., 2002) [hereinaf-
ter Gordon, Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use]. Gordon’s greatly
influential analysis has enriched us with invaluable insights on the nature and
the function of the balancing test that the fair use doctrine entails. Her work is
often presented as being antithetical to a so-called “balancing theory.” Propo-
nents of the latter theory suggest that the market-failure approach may preclude
a proper balancing of the equities underlying the fair use calculus and give prom-
inence to the economic interests of the copyright owner. See Lydia Pallas Loren,
Redefining the Market Failure Approach to Fair Use in an Era of Copyright Per-
mission Systems, 5 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 38–48 (1997) (discussing problems re-
sulting from an approach that would consider “lost” permission fees as harm
cognizable under the copyright laws); Lunney, supra note 122. However, Gordon’s
analysis does not actually suggest that an initially fair use of an earlier work is
automatically transformed into an infringing use because a market failure attrib-
utable to transaction costs has been remedied. See Wendy J. Gordon, Market
Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 1031 (2002). Gordon explained the reasons why a non-creative consumptive
use of an earlier work may qualify as fair use. See Wendy J. Gordon, The Fair Use
Doctrine: Markets, Market Failure and Rights of Use, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECO-
NOMICS OF COPYRIGHT – A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 84 (Richard Watt
ed., 2014).
127. For a more in-depth analysis of this aspect, see Gordon, Excuse and Justification
in the Law of  Fair Use, supra note 126, at 176–87.
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should not contradict each other. This presupposes that the applica-
tion of the fair use defense would not eventually undermine the reli-
ance investments of authors. Just as much as it is important not to
suppress socially desirable dealings with earlier works, it is equally
important to avoid defeating a sensible rule mandating the grant of
property rights in authorial works through an overly generous appli-
cation of its exception.128 Apparently, the fair use analysis imple-
ments a structured balancing test.
It is the nature of the incentives-access paradigm, as the underly-
ing rule of reason, that is actually dictating a mixed liability system
combining a rule of strict liability and a standard of negligence.129
D. A Multifactorial Test: The Role of the Four Factors
The role of the four factors is multifarious. They set out the con-
tours of the injurers’ liability in negligence as resulting from the appli-
cation of copyright’s rule of reason. To varying degrees, each one of
those factors is programmed to take into account both the social utility
generated by the secondary use and the interests of the copyright
owner in a profit-maximizing opportunity, as we shall see. In this ca-
pacity, the factors facilitate the assessment of fair use by guiding the
courts’ efforts to identify the equities involved in a given dispute. Mak-
ing sure that the assessment is as thorough and manageable as possi-
ble, the factors are there to minimize the possibility of error by setting
the appropriate standard and, ideally, reduce the necessity for appel-
late review.130 Beyond that, the four factors are relied upon to define
the level of care owed by third parties to the interests of the rights
128. On this problem, see Frederick Schauer, Exceptions, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 871, 897
(1991) (discussing how “ruleness” retains its nature even if ad hoc exceptions
overriding the rule in exigent circumstances are possible and noting how the
power to create ad hoc exceptions may involve the power to change the rule). In
the case of copyright, the underlying rule of reason suggests exactly that while ad
hoc exceptions are welcome, the default rule should not be changed at the stage of
adjudication. Importantly, however, fair use should not be treated as an excep-
tion that should be construed narrowly. Quite the contrary, it should enjoy the
exact scope attributed to it by the underlying rule of reason. See PATRY, supra
note 98, § 2:5.
129. Hence, the tort of copyright infringement is designed in a manner so that unde-
sirable features of rules like over- and under-inclusiveness or utter selfishness
are corrected through the application of the fair use doctrine while the ineffi-
ciency of the negligence standard in optimally securing authorial incentives and
allocating property rights is corrected by the strict liability rule.
130. See Leval, supra note 121, at 1110–11; Joseph P. Liu, Two-Factor Fair Use?, 31
COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 571, 575–76 (2008) (arguing that such proxies are generally
useful in reducing the informational considerations courts have to take into ac-
count at a manageable level); see also Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the
Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1601–03
(2006) (relying on empirical studies of decision making to highlight the impor-
tance of core factors in deciding complex issues); Kaplow, supra note 93, at
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holder. At this stage, this Article briefly sketches these concepts to
examine them more thoroughly in Part V, the Part dedicated to case
law analysis.
Starting with the first factor, which calls us to consider the nature
and the character of the use, the potential social benefit of a given use
is assessed by asking whether the secondary user has created some-
thing that simply supersedes the objects of the original work131 or in-
stead “adds something new, with a further purpose or different
character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or mes-
sage.”132 Under this approach, a parody, for instance, generates social
value by contributing another viewpoint to our understanding of an
earlier work.133 A service that allows us to search for particular terms
within a long text may provide us with information about the books
available in the marketplace.134 But creating a trivia quiz book test-
ing the public’s knowledge of the characters and the plot of a TV show
would not amount to fair use where the secondary user essentially re-
packages scenes from the earlier work without serving any further
transformative purpose, such as criticism or parody.135 Transforma-
tiveness is thus an indication that the new use has something to offer
in terms of added social utility.136 Under the same factor, courts must
also consider whether there is some commercial motivation behind the
defendant’s acts.137 Courts would have to inquire upon whether the
defendant has been engaging in some sort of welfare-enhancing activ-
ity rather than seeking to derive financial gain from the market value
of the earlier work.138 Surely, if commercialism were given presump-
tive force, even the illustrative uses listed in the preamble of section
107 of the Copyright Act would qualify as unfair uses since news re-
porting, comment, criticism, teaching, scholarship, and research are
566–67 (distinguishing between simple and complex standards whereby the de-
gree of complexity depends on the number of factors to be considered).
131. Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901).
132. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
133. Id.
134. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214–18 (2d Cir. 2015).
135. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142–43 (2d Cir.
1998).
136. Leval, supra note 121, at 1111.
137. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
138. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981) (“The court should also look at
the purpose and character of the alleged infringing use, including its commercial
or non-profit educational motivation or design. While commercial motivation and
fair use can exist side by side, the court may consider whether the alleged infring-
ing use was primarily for public benefit or for private commercial gain.”); see also
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 855 F. Supp. 905, 909 (E.D.
Mich. 1994) (citing the magistrate judge’s report, which found that the reproduc-
tion of course materials by a commercial copyshop amounted to “pure copying for
profit”).
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normally conducted for profit.139 At times, commercial gain would be
vital to the maintenance of optimal activity levels for expressive uses
by securing financial support. In practice, minor importance is usually
ascribed to the commercial aspects of an otherwise socially desirable
secondary use.140
Apparently, transformativeness and commercialism express equi-
ties related both to the profit-maximizing incentives that authors re-
quire and the broader utilitarian goals of copyright. At the same time,
these two terms refer to different dimensions of care. The more trans-
formative the new use, the less likely it becomes that the defendant
has failed to exercise due care toward the legitimate interests of the
copyright owner.141 Duties of care may also be imposed by determin-
ing the intensity of commercial activity that a secondary user is al-
lowed to exercise.142
The second factor instructs us to consider the nature of the earlier
work. Protection of factual works should be thin143 as the dissemina-
tion of information constitutes a core value of copyright policy.144 The
pure dissemination of facts is also unlikely to interfere with the inter-
nalization of benefits that copyright aims to effectuate. The opposite is
more likely to happen where original expression is copied. Under this
factor, courts also consider the interest of authors in the right to con-
trol the first publication of their works, which is also of great economic
importance.145 Special cases excluded, it is seldom that the second fac-
tor turns out to be decisive when assessing fair use.146 Negligence
standards emerging from fair use adjudications essentially define pre-
cautionary measures by determining the qualitative aspects of per-
missible copying.
Similar to the second factor, the third factor’s role is primarily di-
rected at determining an appropriate level of care. Hardly ever does
the assessment under the third factor play a determinative role.147
139. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 584.
140. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 12.2.2–12:28.
141. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 219 (2d Cir. 2015).
142. Seltzer v. Green Day, Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1175–78 (9th Cir. 2013).
143. New Era Publ’ns Int’l., ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152, 157 (2d Cir. 1990)
(“[T]he scope of fair use is greater with respect to factual than non-factual
works.”).
144. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 563 (1985) (“The
law generally recognizes a greater need to disseminate factual works than works
of fiction or fantasy.”).
145. Id. at 564–69; Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 97 (2d Cir. 1987).
146. Beebe, supra note 84, at 584.
147. Id. The second and the third factor were deemed to be of limited relevance in
major fair use cases such as Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 464
U.S. 417, 449–50 (1984), Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 589
(1994), Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1522, 1526–27 (9th Cir.
1992), and Authors Guild, Inc. v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87, 98 (2d Cir. 2014).
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The essential question addressed by the said factor could be phrased
as follows: Given the social value of the secondary use and the reduc-
tion in authorial benefits that it involves, how much is the defendant
able to copy without running afoul of the respective negligence stan-
dard? Of course, the greater the amount and the substantiality of the
material copied, the less likely it becomes for the secondary use to
have the social value of a transformative use,148 while the likelihood
of the defendant impermissibly encroaching upon the economic bene-
fits reserved for the rights holder increases.149 The courts would often
identify specific parts of an earlier work such as the “core” or the
“heart” of a song, a book, or a video.150 Such determinations can also
be seen as parameters of due care. In view of the social value contrib-
uted by a parody, the parodist’s duty of care usually does not involve
an obligation not to copy the very “heart” of an earlier work because
otherwise the socially beneficial use would be disproportionally sup-
pressed.151 But someone who appropriates the informative essence of
an unpublished work before its publication has obviously failed to ex-
ercise due care.152
Often characterized as the most important of all factors,153 the
fourth factor inquires upon the economic harm that the copyright
owner has to sustain in case the secondary use escapes liability and
whether this is proportional to the accruing social benefit as already
identified under the first factor.154 As a rule, the internalizing func-
tion of the copyright owner’s exclusive right “should be extended into
every corner of copyright use.”155 The grant of the legal exclusivity is
perceived as a profit-maximizing opportunity even though it is meant
to promote broader utilitarian aims. Since the copyright owner would
often have to partially forego some of the economic benefits associated
with his or her exclusive legal position, case law has divided the incen-
tives package into identifiable parts or market segments156 not only
148. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587.
149. Id.; Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 221 (2d Cir. 2015).
150. L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 1997).
Other courts use these terms as proxies. See Salinger, 811 F.2d at 98–99.
151. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 588.
152. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 600–01 (1985).
153. Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1385 (6th
Cir. 1996) (“We take it that this factor, ‘the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work,’ is at least primus inter pares, figur-
atively speaking, and we shall turn to it first.”).
154. Hence, the main considerations underlying the fair use analysis are strongly re-
flected in the first and the fourth factors. One may accordingly wonder whether
the assessment of the fair use defense could gain in predictability by relying upon
a two-factor test. See Liu, supra note 130.
155. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 7, § 12.2.2–12:61.
156. In that regard, courts engage in assessments that are akin to the definition of a
relevant market for the purposes of applying the antitrust laws. While market
definition in antitrust law seeks to examine the degree of competitive pressure
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with the aim of balancing the equities involved but also to determine
levels of care. Courts would identify “core,” “traditional markets,”157
“original” or “primary markets,”158 “markets likely to be developed,”
“potential markets” or “reasonable markets”159 to identify whether a
certain loss of economic benefits is justifiable in light of the social util-
ity that the new user offers. Such questions emerge when courts have
to assess, for instance, whether a photographer is entitled to prevent
an appropriation artist from including one of his or her photos into a
collage and selling it.160 Reasonable markets, that is, markets that
are neither developed nor already envisaged as part of a broader busi-
ness expansion plan, would normally be internalized to the benefit of
the copyright owner.161 Courts also use the terms “alternative” or
“further” markets162 to refer to the economic interest of copyright
owners in seeking rents in markets that have opened up long after the
point of creation as a result of some unexpected technological break-
that the defendant faces, the delineation of a relevant market for copyright pur-
poses is necessary for determining the scope of the right. Defining a relevant
market in the context of copyright infringement proceedings while assessing fair
use aims at implementing the copyright rule of reason. Cf. Image Tech. Servs.,
Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 125 F.3d 1195, 1216–17 (9th Cir. 1997) (“The relevant
market for determining the patent or copyright grant is determined under patent
or copyright law.”).
157. Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913, 927 (2d Cir. 1994).
158. L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1123 (9th Cir. 1997).
159. Castle Rock Entm’t, Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 145–46 (2d Cir.
1998); Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930.
160. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
161. Castle Rock, 150 F.3d at 145–46 (considering whether the right to market a quiz
book based on a TV show laid with its producer who owned the respective copy-
right and not the defendant, ultimately ruling that the fourth factor cut against
the finding of fair use). As the Second Circuit explained,
Although Castle Rock has evidenced little if any interest in exploiting
this market for derivative works based on Seinfeld, such as by creating
and publishing Seinfeld trivia books (or at least trivia books that en-
deavor to ‘satisfy’ the ‘between-episode cravings’ of Seinfeld lovers), the
copyright law must respect that creative and economic choice.
Id. at 146–47. The defendant’s use was deemed unfair primarily because it lacked
transformative character without the court having to balance such harm with
some sort of social benefit generated by the secondary use). Id. at 147. In the
same litigation, the lower court observed that “[i]t would . . . not serve the ends of
the Copyright Act—i.e., to advance the arts—if artists were denied their monop-
oly over derivative versions of their creative works merely because they made the
artistic decision not to saturate those markets with variations of their original.”
Castle Rock Entm’t v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 955 F. Supp. 260, 272 (S.D.N.Y.
1997); see also Salinger v. Random House, Inc., 811 F.2d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 1987)
(“[T]he need to assess the effect on the market for Salinger’s letters is not less-
ened by the fact that their author has disavowed any intention to publish them
during his lifetime. [The copyright owner] has the right to change his mind. He is
entitled to protect his opportunity to sell his letters, an opportunity estimated by
his literary agent to have a current value in excess of $500,000.”).
162. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001).
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through. Authorial incentives would be reduced if it were prescribed
beforehand that new and particularly lucrative means of exploitation
should not be available to copyright owners.163 As the Supreme Court
has stressed, authors even have a reasonable expectation to benefit
from any renewals or extensions of the copyright term legislated while
their copyrights are still in force.164 Copyright protection would be
rendered pointless if the secondary use essentially deprives the copy-
right owner of his or her “traditional markets.”165
163. Gordon, An Inquiry into the Merits of Copyright, supra note 58, at 1385. The flexi-
bility of the fair use doctrine provides the courts with some leeway to reconsider
the optimal scope of governance rules within a framework based on an exclusion
strategy when the social or economic value of the work is rising. On this aspect of
property rights, see Smith, supra note 66.
164. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 189 (2003) (upholding the constitutionality of
the 1998 Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, which was enacted to ex-
tend the copyright term). Cf. WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 228–34 (2003) (arguing
that ad hoc extensions of protection might be necessary to provide ex post incen-
tives for maintaining or even increasing the economic value of a work).
165. Market definition, in the sense of identifying the markets in which the rights
holder is allowed to seek rents, differs from the need to refer to a given market in
order to assess antitrust harm. This is because the plaintiff’s markets may in-
clude uses related to products that are not (close enough) substitutes—such as
the TV series and the respective trivia book involved in Castle Rock. Antitrust
law is concerned with the acquisition of market power that may allow the defen-
dant to reduce output, increase prices, exclude competitors, or impede innovation.
Copyright law, on the other hand, focuses on a different type of harm consisting
in the reduction of authorial incentives, which results from encroachments upon
plaintiff’s markets. On those differences, see Herbert J. Hovenkamp, Markets in
IP and Antitrust, 100 GEO. L.J. 2133, 2148–49 (2012), and Mark A. Lemley &
Mark P. McKenna, Is Pepsi Really a Substitute for Coke? Market Definition in
Antitrust and IP, 100 GEO. L.J. 2055, 2074–75 (2012). Driven by the need to clar-
ify the doctrine of fair use on the grounds of a robust underlying principle, Judge
Posner sought to derive principles for the administration of the fair use standard
from the antitrust analysis for identifying a relevant market in Ty, Inc. v. Publi-
cations International, 292 F.3d 512 (7th Cir. 2002). Adopting an antitrust lens,
the opinion suggested that copying which is complementary to the original work,
in the same vein that nails are considered complementary to hammers, amounts
to fair use because in those instances there is no substitution and, therefore, no
market harm. Hence, the publishing of guides about some copyrighted stuffed
animal toys called “Beanie Babies” was found to be fair use under this notion. An
additional step was required, however, to complete the analogy since copyright
could be relied upon to enjoin uses giving rise to derivative works that are not
substitutes of the original work. To draw the full analogy, Judge Posner sug-
gested that infringement should be affirmed whenever the defendant’s copying
substitutes not only for the original work but also for its derivatives. This ap-
proach is appealing to some scholars who believe that the market concept is too
broadly conceived in the field of copyright law resulting in overbroad exclusive
rights. See Anna F. Kingsbury, Market Definition in Intellectual Property Law:
Should Intellectual Property Courts Use an Antitrust Approach to Market Defini-
tion?, 8 INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 63, 88 (2004); Sara K. Stadler, Relevant Markets for
Copyrighted Works, 34 J. CORP. L. 1059 (arguing that the scope of copyrights
should extend only to cases where there is reasonable interchangeability of crea-
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Importantly, those identifiable markets serve also as means to de-
fine the requisite level of care. A court may rule, for example, that
copying is allowed only to the extent that a given type of market is not
harmed. To the extent copying is restricted to that level, the defendant
can argue that he or she has managed to comply with the negligence
standard imposed.166
E. Administrating the Multifactorial Test
Any fair use assessment should result from a balancing of the equi-
ties manifest in each one of those factors. The proper administration of
a multifactorial test requires an assessment of how each individual
relevant aspect is capable of affecting the outcome. This must involve
a proper correlation of the factors. In Campbell, a case involving a rap
group recording their own parodic rendition of the song “Pretty Wo-
tive products). Professor Nimmer had formulated a pure copyright theory, which
is generally known as the “functional test.” See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note
72, § 13.05[A][5][b], at 13-211. His approach is antithetical to the transformative
use paradigm in the sense that it sought to re-shift the focus on the fourth factor.
The “functional test” asks whether the earlier and the later work share the same
function. A comprehensive review of that theory lies beyond the scope of this foot-
note as well as this Article. While the “functional test” provides a rational expla-
nation for exempting some secondary uses like parodies or may, for instance,
elucidate the reason why the publication of a short abstract from a biography did
not qualify as fair use in Harper & Row, it essentially ends up distorting the fair
use analysis. Foreseeable or not, some complementary uses offer attractive li-
censing opportunities for copyright owners who may decide during the copyright
term to exploit them. Rather than categorically excluding secondary uses from
plaintiff’s markets, it is preferable to have the issues resolved through an actual
administration of the standard, which requires a proper balancing of the equities
involved. It is in this way that the welfare-maximizing solution will be reached.
Concluding on the issue of market definition in IP, it is not necessary, in my view,
to resort to antitrust methodologies. Market definition, at least for the purposes
of applying the fair use doctrine, could be understood in very loose terms as a
process of determining market segments in order to make a decision about
whether an identified piece of a bigger pie should go to the copyright owner. In
this way, a relevant market is defined for the purposes of identifying the particu-
lar harm that copyright laws seek to redress. The idea of adopting a functional
approach to market definition is probably what market references in the context
of the application of the fair use doctrine and the scrutiny about antitrust injury
in a given market have in common. On the need for a functional approach to
market definition in antitrust cases, see generally Louis Kaplow, Why (Ever) De-
fine Markets?, 124 HARV. L. REV. 437 (2010).
166. As the statutory list of relevant factors is not exhaustive, courts may consider
additional factors other than those explicitly mentioned in section 107, including
defendant’s bad faith. See NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 72, § 13.05[A[5][b], at
13-206.8–13-207. This aspect of the fair use analysis mirrors the approach taken
by the broad “balancing test” resorted to by courts concretizing a negligence stan-
dard which involves a consideration of the alleged tortfeasor’s moral status or the
utility of his conduct to the society and third parties. See generally DOBBS, HAY-
DEN & BUBLICK, supra note 95, § 160.
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man,” the Supreme Court elaborated upon the interrelationships be-
tween the four factors.167
A highly transformative secondary use is less likely to give rise to
substitutes for the original or its plausible derivatives.168 While in-
quiring upon whether the amount and substantiality of the appropri-
ated material suggested that the secondary use is fair or not under the
third factor, the Court noted that due consideration must be given to
the defendant’s justification, that is, the social benefit of its actions,
which emerges from the considerations underlying the first factor.169
As a rule, the extent of permissible copying varies according to the
purpose and the character of the use at hand.170 Once the extent of
copying has been measured both in quantitative and qualitative
terms, judges can also assess the capacity of the secondary use to give
rise to an effective market substitute for the original work or to usurp
a plaintiff’s markets for licensed derivatives. The latter observation
highlights the interrelationship between the third and fourth
factors.171
A proper fair use analysis must draw those dialectical interrela-
tionships between the various equities manifest in the four factors.172
Case law has ample examples of the courts either tallying the four
factors according to their inclinations to favor the position maintained
by one of the parties to the dispute or failing to draw the necessary
correlation between the equities involved.
In Sony,173 the Supreme Court opined that commercial uses should
be presumptively unfair not only in an attempt to increase the predict-
ability of the fair use analysis but also to secure solid protection for
the authorial incentives as one of the aspects relevant to the overall
assessment. The Supreme Court retreated, however, from that posi-
tion in Campbell, where it stressed the importance of correlating all
the equities emerging from the consideration of the individual fac-
tors.174 Seeking to strengthen their legal position, plaintiffs have un-
167. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 578 (1994). On the general
precedential value and influence of Campbell, see Pierre N. Leval, Campbell as
Fair Use Blueprint, 90 WASH. L. REV. 597 (2015).
168. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591; Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 214 (2d
Cir. 2015).
169. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586–87.
170. Id.
171. Google, 804 F.3d at 221.
172. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 578 (“Nor may the four statutory factors be treated in iso-
lation, one from another. All are to be explored, and the results weighed together,
in light of the purposes of copyright.”); see also Pac. & S. Co. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d
1490, 1495 (11th Cir. 1984) (elaborating upon the Supreme Court’s analysis of
the four factors); 2 HOWARD B. ABRAMS, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT § 15:31, at 15–65
(2013) (explaining that the four factors are meant to be considered together).
173. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 449 (1984).
174. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 583–85.
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successfully sought to prompt the courts to rely on presumptions such
as the one invoked in Williams & Wilkins,175 where a publishing
house was not successful in persuading the court that the appropria-
tion of an entire work should never amount to fair use. Even trans-
formativeness itself, which has been elevated to a consideration of
prime significance due to the social value of the new use, does not de-
termine the outcome of the fair use analysis without being considered
in correlation with the other factors first.176
As a true negligence standard meant to be administrated on the
basis of a case-by-case analysis, the fair use calculus could not be
bound to the chariot wheels of generalized per se rules and a priori
presumptions.177
F. Copyright Infringement as a Bilateral Accident: When
the Rights Holder Has an Incentive to Exercise
Due Care
Various aspects of copyright law can be perceived as designed to
induce potential plaintiffs to exercise due care so as to minimize the
costs of copyright accidents even under a strict liability regime. The
risk of accidental infringement, for instance, may be alleviated
through notice and registration.178 Albeit not compulsory, the obser-
vation of those formalities is strongly encouraged by the statute.179
Copyright owners could further reduce the risk of accidental infringe-
175. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345, 1353 (Ct. Cl. 1973), aff’d,
420 U.S. 376 (1975).
176. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2014).
177. William F. Patry & Shira Perlmutter, Fair Use Misconstrued: Profit, Presump-
tions, and Parody, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 667, 708 (1993). Cf. Lloyd L.
Weinreb, Fair’s Fair: A Comment on the Fair Use Doctrine, 103 HARV. L. REV.,
1137, 1138 (1990) (noting that what amounts to fair use must be deducted from
concrete cases).
178. Bracha and Goold argue that in cases of accidental infringement, the observation
of formalities constitutes a measure that defendants may take to minimize the
risk of copyright accidents. In their view, the tort of copyright infringement
should be restructured to require plaintiffs to establish fault in action as an ele-
ment of their prima facie case. Bracha and Goold, supra note 5, at 1037–40. That
would indeed render copyright infringement a negligence tort. In the meantime,
they argue, the doctrine of fair use could accommodate the concerns associated
with accidental copyright infringement by exculpating those defendants who
have exercised due care. Id. at 1080–90; see also Ruth Okediji, Givers, Takers,
and Other Kinds of Users: A Fair Use Doctrine for Cyberspace, 53 FLA. L. REV.
107, 155–56 (2001) (noting that formalities, along with other requirements for
copyright protection such as fixation, facilitate access-welfare objectives).
179. Copyright Act § 401(d), 17 U.S.C. § 401(d) (2012) (the defense of innocent in-
fringement cannot be relied upon to mitigate statutory damages when proper no-
tice has been attached to the copies of the work); Copyright Act § 401(a)
(registration of the work gives rise to a prima facie presumption of the validity of
the copyright).
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ment by disseminating information about the copyright status of their
works.180 It seems that even under a strict liability regime, copyright
owners would have an incentive to exercise due care to avoid infringe-
ment whenever they reckon that avoiding litigation is preferable de-
spite the availability of strong compensatory remedies.181 And there is
always the option to control the access to copyrighted works through
the introduction of permission systems or the adoption of digital rights
management to eschew infringement.
Under the fourth factor, the plaintiff will often prevail if the secon-
dary use encroaches upon already developed markets. Where the
plaintiff has not created a market, the likelihood of a fair use finding
increases. Therefore, the rights holder can minimize the expected cost
of an accident by developing a specific market before it becomes occu-
pied by potential defendants.182 At the very least, accident costs will
be reduced because in the very same market it will be possible both for
the copyright owner to enjoy economic benefits and for third parties to
engage in welfare-enhancing secondary uses to the extent that the fair
use defense allows it. Since the requisite level of care refers to the
development of a given market and therefore it is known to the court,
the assessment of the fourth factor would under such circumstances
function as revealing a negligence standard with which the plaintiff
failed to comply and third parties in a similar position have to
consider.
180. Bracha and Goold, supra note 5, at 1047.
181. Id. at 1048.
182. Developing a market that seemed to be simply potential at the moment of crea-
tion reduces the cost or the risk of an accident but does not eliminate it. The
copyright owner may not without more pre-empt exploitative uses within a mar-
ket simply because he or she has managed to develop that market. Bill Graham
Archives v. Dorling Kindersley Ltd., 448 F.3d 605 (2d Cir. 2006) illustrates that
point. Defendant’s book, Grateful Dead: The Illustrated Trip, which takes the
reader through the history of the well celebrated rock band, contained thumbnail
images of copyrighted concert posters. After finding that the secondary use was
transformative, the Second Circuit noted that the fact that the plaintiff had al-
ready been engaging in the licensing of its images for use in book publications did
not tilt the balance of equities in its favor. Quoting Castle Rock, the court further
observed that “[i]n a case [of transformative secondary use], a copyright holder
cannot prevent others from entering fair use markets merely ‘by developing or
licensing a market for parody, news reporting, educational or other transforma-
tive uses of its own creative work.’” Id. at 615–16 (quoting Castle Rock Entm’t,
Inc. v. Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998)). Licensing behavior
should not be determinative without more. Before giving effect to current licens-
ing practices, we should consider whether the market emerged as a result of ex-
cessive risk aversion causing the defendants to request a license with respect to a
use that is otherwise fair. On this point, see Wendy J. Gordon, The ‘Why’ of Mar-
kets: Fair Use and Circularity, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 358 (2007) (refining
the analysis of James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Rights Accretion in Intellectual
Property Law, 116 YALE L.J. 882 (2007), who argued that markets characterized
by excessive risk aversion should not be relevant to the fair use analysis).
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Sometimes, a market may not exist because of prohibitive transac-
tion costs.183 Quite often, such market failures would be remedied by
centrally administrated licensing schemes or some other form of li-
censing innovation. Where the court possesses the information neces-
sary for remedying the market failure, it would make a relevant
reference stressing what the plaintiff has failed to do, thereby essen-
tially giving notice of his or her failure to comply with a negligence
standard. Where such information is unavailable, courts should gen-
erally refrain from affirming fair use without first examining the pos-
sibility of their ruling interfering with the development of licensing
schemes in the marketplace. In any event, the plaintiff would have an
incentive to exercise due care since he or she is the ultimate bearer of
the accident’s costs.184 Hence, a plaintiff’s incentive would be either to
remedy the market failure or to create sufficient financial incentives
for others to do so. Such potential losses of copyright owners would in
all likelihood induce third parties to facilitate the emergence of a mar-
ket on their own initiative. Rights holders may take other precaution-
ary measures to control the access to their works such as the adoption
of permission systems or digital rights management.185
Indirect appropriability is another means for a copyright owner
confronted with new copying technologies to exercise care toward the
vitality of his or her own economic interests by charging higher prices
for the original copies of the works that will eventually form the basis
for further unauthorized copying.186 Journal photocopying is an exam-
ple thereof.187 Copyright owners can appropriate the value of unau-
thorized copying taking place within libraries or research
organizations if they charge such institutions with subscription fees
that are higher than those applicable to individuals. When assessing
fair use, courts consider the options plaintiffs have in order to mini-
mize the expected costs of an accident and, as we shall see, the result
of the fair use analysis is meant to induce the copyright owner to take
those precautions that are cost-efficient.188
183. See Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure, supra note 126.
184. This is another application of the general principle that a rule of negligence
would be efficient even without a defense of contributory negligence. See POLIN-
SKY, supra note 23, at 50.
185. Technical protection measures should not undermine fair use. This Article will
not address this problem. See generally Pamela Samuelson, Possible Futures of
Fair Use, 90 WASH. L. REV. 815, 859–62 (2015) (reviewing the literature on the
topic and arguing that fair use adjudication will eventually clarify the circum-
stances under which technical restrictions may be overridden).
186. Liebowitz, Back to the Future, supra note 97, at 6.
187. See generally S. J. Liebowitz, Copying and Indirect Appropriability: Photocopying
of Journals, 93 J. POL. ECON. 945 (1985).
188. Collection of evidence could also be perceived as a dimension of care. While the
burden of persuasion rests with the defendant, the plaintiff has an incentive to
collect information about risks to his or her markets stemming from specific sec-
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V. CASE LAW ANALYSIS
A. Institutional Photocopying
The relevant activity that should be regulated lies in the reproduc-
tion of lawfully acquired copies, especially of literary works by re-
search-driven enterprises such as corporate research departments,
medical institutions, or consultancy firms. A concomitant of the
“reprographic revolution,” the newly established possibility of creating
multiple copies of printed material at a low cost, raised concerns over
the effect of excessive copying on the policies that copyright is sup-
posed to promote. It was the Court of Claims that found itself in the
tight spot of having to rule on this issue first.
In Williams & Wilkins v. United States,189 a publisher of medical
journals and books sued the government alleging infringement of its
copyrights through unauthorized photocopies made by the National
Institute of Health (NIH) and the National Library of Medicine
(NLM).
Before getting into any formal analysis of the four factors, the
court placed emphasis on the precautionary measures that defendants
had already carried through to prevent the infliction of harm to the
copyright owner’s interests.190 NIH’s policy accommodated photocopy-
ing requests limited to a single article from a journal issue. No more
than fifty pages could be photocopied.191 NLM, a virtual treasury of
the world’s medical literature, took up the role of a caterer to other
libraries and intellectually-oriented institutions through an inter-
library loan scheme.192 Loans would often take the form of gratis pho-
toduplicates that the user was not obliged to return.193 Again, each
request was limited to one photocopy of a particular journal article.194
Individual users could not place more than twenty requests per
month.195 For institutions, the number of permissible requests rose to
thirty.196 NLM would reject requests to copy more than one article per
journal issue or more than three articles per journal volume. Any cop-
ies made bore a note clarifying that they were made in lieu of lending
the original work.197 As a general rule, such loan requests could not
ondary uses since he or she is the residual bearer of the accident’s costs. The
absence of any evidence of harm on behalf of the plaintiff would make it easier for
the defendant to live up to the onus of showing that his or her use does not in-
volve the infliction of harm that is cognizable under copyright law.
189. Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, 487 F.2d 1345 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
190. Id. at 1348–49, 1354.
191. Id. at 1348.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 1349.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1348.
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be placed with respect to articles featured in some specific journals,
which were deemed to be widely available because they were recently
published and formed part of collections maintained in regional medi-
cal libraries.198 The policies of both institutions were generous enough
to recognize some exceptions to those general rules without substan-
tially altering the level of photocopying activity resulting from the li-
braries’ practices. Finally, those researchers who obtained copies of
the journal articles were not likely to create further copies with a view
to making profit from their sale.
The court’s trepidation in affirming fair use reflected concerns
about ensuing hindrances to medical and scientific research in case
the plaintiff was successful in his claim.199 Researchers would have to
cut down their reading or engage in time consuming hassles such as
extensive note taking in a remote library to collect the materials they
need to study in the convenience of their working place. What tipped
the balance of equities in favor of the defendant was the fact that the
plaintiff was not able to substantiate actual harm suffered as a result
of the defendant dealing with its works.200 Evidence of subscriptions
cancelled due to the availability of photocopying was inconsequential.
In fact, the record showed a substantial increase in annual subscrip-
tion sales, as did the plaintiff’s annual taxable income. The plaintiff’s
business had actually been growing faster than the country’s GDP.201
Apart from that, any evidence of infringing use concerned no more
than a small part of the plaintiff’s turnover. In the absence of actual
harm, the court had no reservation about giving the prevalence to the
public interest of promoting medical research.202
Although the use of the original works did interfere with the inter-
nalizing function of the plaintiff’s copyrights since some licensing op-
portunities had been foregone, the court was adamant that such
reduction of the benefits included in the “incentives package” would be
exceedingly outweighed by the social gains in augmented medical re-
search accruing from the secondary use.203 Hence, despite the de-
crease in benefits that could be internalized in favor of the rights
holder, the defendant was deemed to have exercised due care.204
198. Id. at 1349.
199. Id. at 1356–57.
200. Id. at 1359.
201. Id. at 1357.
202. Id. at 1359.
203. Id. at 1354.
204. The decision of the Court of Claims has been criticized on the grounds that it did
not take into account the cumulative effect on plaintiff’s markets emerging from
copying carried out “by any and all libraries and similar institutions.” See NIM-
MER & NIMMER, supra note 72, § 13.05[E][4][c], at 13-252. It seems, however, as
our analysis of Williams & Wilkins above suggests, that the Court of Claims prac-
tically imposed a personalized standard of care considering the nature and the
function of the specific libraries involved, the plaintiff’s business model, and the
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While determining the requisite level of care, the court took into
account the defendants’ nature as public non-profit institutions de-
voted to the dissemination of medical knowledge.205 The defendants
were therefore entities particularly capable of increasing the levels of
the desired activity toward the optimal level. In addition, the fact that
the research featured in the plaintiff’s journals had been funded by
the state was taken to mean that its copyright should allow for extra
“breathing space,” at least as far as those particular defendants were
concerned, considering the general principle that any attempt to pre-
scribe the exclusionary effect of copyright should reflect an awareness
that there is no single work of authorship that is not somehow elabo-
rating upon pre-existing creative efforts. Equally, the court took into
account the fact that the authors of the journal articles were not remu-
nerated and the medical societies collaborating to the publishing ven-
ture did not pose exorbitant financial demands for their share in the
profits.206 This part of the court’s analysis could be perceived as prac-
tically seeking to personalize the standard of liability.207
contemporary circumstances surrounding funded medical research. Narrowing
down that precedent would thus require a very detailed identification of the dis-
tinguishing facts.
205. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1354.
206. Id. at 1359.
207. This is also evident in the concluding remarks of the opinion where the court
enunciated its ruling being applicable to the specific set of facts it addressed
without exonerating from liability other instances of photocopying. Exactly on
that score, one could distinguish other cases where photocopying is carried out by
different categories of defendants. In Princeton University Press v. Michigan Doc-
ument Services, Inc., 99 F.3d 1381 (6th Cir. 1996), for instance, the court held
that photocopying of course materials by a commercial copyshop did not amount
to fair use. The copying done by the defendants was deemed to be excessive after
consideration of “its systematic and premeditated character, its magnitude, its
anthological content, and its commercial motivation . . . .” Princeton Univ. Press,
99 F.3d at 1390. While it remains unresolved whether the outcome would have
been different if copying had been carried out by a student or a non-profit educa-
tional institution, it seems as if those defendants will eventually be subjected to a
standard of care that is different than the one imposed on commercial copyshops.
In Cambridge University Press v. Patton, 769 F.3d 1232 (11th Cir. 2014), the
court found that the first factor favored the defendant professors who had been
engaging in a non-profit educational use, which should be exempted from liability
“under certain circumstances.” Cambridge Univ. Press, 769 F.3d at 1267. The
court did not proceed to deliver a complete fair use analysis because the case was
remanded, but it does indicate that a personalized standard of care would have
been applicable. See generally ABRAMS, supra note 172, § 15:125. The “Agreement
on Guidelines for Classroom Copying in Not-For-Profit Educational Institutions
with Respect to Books and Periodicals,” H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 68–71, (1976),
which has been acknowledged by the House Report as a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the minimum standards of fair use, are actually formulated as standards
of care. These guidelines are not intended to preempt the fair use analysis. On
the latter point, see KENNETH CREWS, COPYRIGHT, FAIR USE, AND THE CHALLENGE
FOR UNIVERSITIES – PROMOTING THE PROGRESS OF HIGHER EDUCATION 131–35
(1993).
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One could argue that social welfare would be possibly maximized
under a scheme where the libraries would have to pay reasonable li-
censing fees. That would top-up the incentives package without reduc-
ing the levels of the desired activity. Workable options included a
compulsory licensing regime relying on a clearinghouse collective sys-
tem or a viable licensing scheme introduced by the plaintiffs.208 The
first solution suggests that legislative intervention is necessary be-
cause tort law obligations are not capable of inducing both parties to
exercise due care. The second solution essentially leaves the plaintiff
to bear the costs of the accident, envisaging that he or she would exer-
cise due care, since otherwise he or she would be deprived of licensing
fees that the secondary user would be willing to pay.209
The court in Williams & Wilkins did not proceed to implement any
of those suggestions, succumbing to legislative authority after essen-
tially acknowledging that it did not possess the information required
for setting the level of optimal care for the plaintiff.210 Notably, the
negligence standard imposed on the libraries only induces optimal
levels of activity with respect to institutional photocopying that aug-
ments medical research. The same standard also promotes the opti-
mal use, and therefore the financing, of reprographic technology.
Thus, these two separate activities could be regulated through the
same standard of care in that instance.
A negligence standard for the defendant would prompt publishers
either to set up a viable licensing scheme or simply engage in effective
price discrimination, charging higher fees for institutional subscrip-
tions. Precautionary measures were taken collectively by the industry
to develop a voluntary licensing scheme operated by the Copyright
Clearance Center (CCC), which acts as an intermediary reducing
transaction costs and allowing the conclusion of welfare-maximizing
agreements that would not have been possible otherwise.
In American Geophysical Union v. Texaco,211 the Second Circuit
ruled that the reproduction of journal articles taking place at the de-
fendant’s research department did not amount to fair use since there
208. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1360.
209. Compare NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 72, § 13.05[E][4][e], at 13-259 (arguing
that intermediate remedies would be helpful in such cases), with Marc R. K.
Bungeroth, Copyright—Photocopying as Fair Use—Williams & Wilkins Co. v.
United States, 16 B.C. INDUS & COM. L. REV. 141, 149 (1974) (taking the opposite
view by arguing that the doctrine of fair use compels courts to balance the equi-
ties involved in the disputes they have to adjudicate). Intermediate remedies may
be helpful in maintaining favorable conditions for markets to emerge. The court
in Williams and Wilkins was apparently concerned with the progress of medical
research during the period between the grant of some intermediate remedy and
the point where a viable licensing scheme would be introduced given that the
libraries had taken measures to avoid excessive copying.
210. Williams & Wilkins, 487 F.2d at 1360–61.
211. American Geophysical Union v. Texaco, 60 F.3d 913 (2d Cir. 1994).
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existed a convenient means for remunerating the copyright owner.212
Evading the CCC system for paying royalties can be paralleled to a
failure to exercise due care. Apparently, the cost of the accident is
minimized when both parties are induced to exercise care through
negligence standards.
Texaco is one of those cases that were rightfully decided with the
court applying a correct negligence standard. Nevertheless, the tech-
nical analysis of the opinion does not really reflect an assessment of
the requisite level of care resulting from a proper balancing of the eq-
uities involved. Rather, the analysis of the court seems to have placed
grave emphasis on which party could win more of the arguments asso-
ciated with the four factors. Texaco slumped to a 3–1 defeat.213
Regarding the first factor and the nature of the secondary use, the
court surmised that Texaco narrowly lost out on the “non-profit” argu-
ment holding the secondary use to be an “intermediate” one as the
defendant’s profits did not directly stem from the copies of the rele-
vant scientific papers.214 Assessing the character of the use, the court
observed that Texaco had been engaging in archival copying.215 The
copies had not been made with the aim of facilitating any specific re-
search project but were meant to facilitate research efforts within the
enterprise, ensuring that no hold ups transpired because more scien-
tists needed to consult the same source. On those terms, Williams &
Wilkins should be distinguished. Since photocopying “merely trans-
form[ed] the material object embodying the intangible article that is
the copyrighted original work,” the secondary use was deemed non-
transformative.216 Consequently, in the court’s view, the first factor
favored the plaintiffs.
While the court was cognizant of the value derived from a more
usable format, it did not consider that this should carry any weight in
the fair use calculus. Otherwise, the court suggested, any photocopy-
ing could potentially be justified as providing for a more convenient
format for enjoying an earlier work of authorship.217 In that regard,
the court’s analysis did not, as a proper fair use analysis requires, ac-
tually put the benefit to social welfare accruing from the secondary
use in perspective with a view to subsequently assessing whether the
defendant’s activities had been excessive in the sense of the latter not
having exercised due care toward the interests of the copyright owner
as these manifest themselves in the fourth factor. No attempt to corre-
late the first and the fourth factor was made by the court apart from
212. Id. at 931–32.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 921.
215. Id. at 919–20.
216. Id. at 923.
217. Id. at 924.
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stating that Texaco could not rely on the argument that its use was
customary since the analysis of the fourth factor suggested that the
market participants would now expect the secondary use to be li-
censed.218 Texaco won the second factor as the infringed work was
deemed to be of a factual nature.219
However, even if the court had ruled that the first factor margin-
ally favored the defendant, which would have levelled the score 2–2,
the outcome of the fair use analysis would not have been different af-
ter the equities involved were weighted against each other. Only the
third factor, which favored the plaintiffs because the defendants had
copied the totality of individual works of authorship, was correlated to
the first factor as confirming, in the court’s view, the non-transforma-
tive character and archival purpose of the copies made.220 Although
the court reiterated the principle that the third factor serves as a
proxy for determining whether harm to the plaintiff’s markets is im-
minent and for assessing whether the amount of copying has been pro-
portional to the welfare enhancing purpose of the new use,221 none of
those correlations were properly advanced. A proper correlation be-
tween the first and the third factor did not materialize as the court did
not put the social benefit accrued from “archival copies” within corpo-
rate research departments in perspective. For the rest, the third factor
was simply counted as favoring the publishers because Texaco had
copied entire works.222
After acknowledging harm to the “workable [licensing] market” for
institutional users, the court concluded its “aggregate assessment” by
stating,
[T]hree of the four statutory factors, including the important first and the
fourth factors, favor the publishers. We recognize that the statutory factors
provide a nonexclusive guide to analysis . . . but to whatever extent more gen-
eralized equitable considerations are relevant, we are in agreement with the
District Court’s analysis of them. . . . We therefore agree with the District
Court’s conclusion that Texaco’s photocopying . . . was not fair use.223
In any event, Texaco stands for the proposition that the scope of
the copyright owner’s rights would extend to all those newly created
markets that the rights holder had not been able to exploit in the past
due to prohibitive transaction costs that are no longer present, pro-
vided, of course, that the overall fair use analysis dictates a conclusion
of the secondary use being unfair. But the plaintiff can only prevail if
he or she has exercised due care, that is, if he or she has created the
market for that secondary use. Apparently, the negligence standard
218. Id.
219. Id. at 925.
220. Id. at 926.
221. Id.
222. Id.
223. Id. at 929–32 (citations omitted).
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imposed generates incentives for third parties to come up with innova-
tive licensing schemes or technologies drastically reducing transaction
costs for which the copyright owner is willing to pay.224 In many such
instances, copyright owners would have an incentive to finance R&D
efforts that facilitate the emergence of such markets. Again, the negli-
gence standard for the plaintiff is also apt for regulating the activity
levels for third-party innovation.
Concluding its overall assessment of the four factors, the court
dealt with the reservations expressed in the dissent of Judge Jacob
who reckoned that the majority opinion “has ended fair-use photocopy-
ing with respect to a large population of journals.”225 In its reply, the
court stressed that its ruling was confined to the institutional, system-
atic, and archival copying of the specific journal articles covered by the
copyrights in suit, which took place in a specific market context where
viable licensing schemes were already in place.226 Within that state-
ment, the notion is lurking that fair use creates personalized stan-
dards of negligence, which will nevertheless develop in broader
negligence-based rule-like standards covering all clearly analogous
cases.227
B. Comment and Criticism
The preeminent Nashville music publisher Acuff-Rose music, the
party who owned the copyright in the song “Oh, Pretty Woman” writ-
ten by Roy Orbison and Bill Dees, filed suit against a controversial
and provocative rap-group from Miami, the 2 Live Crew, and their re-
cord company, Luke Skyywalker Records, after they released a hip-
hop parody based on that song.228 Before that, Acuff-Rose had refused
the defendant’s offer to authorize the parody in exchange for a fee and
a proper attribution of the copyright owner, as well as of the songwrit-
ers.229 Instead of the original romantic references to a pretty woman
spotted walking down the street, the parody told the more pejorative
tale of a “big hairy woman.”230 The case eventually reached the Su-
preme Court, which took the opportunity to clarify the application of
the fair use doctrine to parodies.231
224. Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights
and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1293, 1298–1300 (1996)
(showing how market solutions would normally emerge to address such market
failures).
225. Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 931.
226. Id. at 931–32.
227. The same principles should apply to photocopying occurring in the course of a law
firm’s operation. See ABRAMS, supra note 172, § 15:116.
228. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 574 (1994).
229. Id.
230. Id. at 595.
231. Id. at 579–94.
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Falling back on dictionary definitions of parody,232 the Court first
sought to ascertain in general terms the type of activity concerned.
Under a lexical definition, parody constitutes a “literary or artistic
work that imitates the characteristic style of an author or a work for
comic effect or ridicule.”233 In a similar vein, parody could be defined
as a “composition in prose or verse in which the characteristic turns of
thought and phrase in an author or class of authors are imitated in
such a way as to make them appear ridiculous.”234 In legal terms, pa-
rodic activity involves the appropriation of copyrighted material to
create a new work that comments upon the prior work. Parodies en-
hance social welfare both by generating a new expressive work and
“by shedding light on an earlier work.”235 While assessing the nature
of the defendant’s song, the Court noted that the degrading taunts,
the bawdy demand for sex and the sigh of relief from paternal respon-
sibility conveyed by its lyrics could be taken as a comment shedding
light on the naivete of the earlier work and its era.236 2 Live Crew’s
parody could be perceived as a rejection of its sentiment and ignorance
of the realities of street life. The defendant has therefore indeed been
engaging in socially desirable parodic activity.237 In essence, the
Court indicated in its judgement that commercial parodies have an
equally legitimate claim to fair use since the social benefit they gener-
ate is no less than that involved in purely expressive parodies. In fact,
such economic benefit may facilitate the parodists’ efforts to dissemi-
nate a given critical commentary or support further parodic activities.
Inasmuch as the parodist is permitted to capitalize upon the ele-
ments borrowed from the earlier work, the copyright owner has to
forego some of the benefits that his or her exclusive right would have
otherwise internalized since the social benefits of parodic expression
would normally outweigh any potential losses in authorial incentives
that might result from the trimming of the incentives package. A li-
censing market for purely parodic derivatives should not count as a
copyright owner’s “potential market” for the purposes of assessing fair
use under the fourth factor since the rights holder is normally inclined
to suppress critical reviews of his or her works, as Justice Souter ex-
plained.238 Otherwise, the levels of parodic activity would be lower
than the optimum.
With respect to the level of care, parodists may freely appropriate
copyrighted material regardless of its creative or factual nature up to
232. Id. at 580.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 579.
236. Id. at 582.
237. Id. at 583.
238. Id. at 592–93.
434 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:384
the extent that their expressive purpose requires them to “conjure up”
the original.239 Provided that such due care is exercised, third parties
may maximize their levels of parodic activity. Activity levels would
not be considered as excessive even when a parody turns out to be so
successful that demand for the original work eventually subsides be-
cause the consuming public no longer appreciates it anymore. Such
harm is not cognizable under the Copyright Act.240 A duty of care to-
ward the interests of the copyright owner is likely to arise when the
parodic work develops into a substitute for the original.241 Parody,
just like other forms of artistic commentary, does not provide third
parties with a “carte blanche” to exploit the creative effort of others
without paying compensation. Justice Kennedy concurred, stressing
this very point by observing that “[i]f we allow any weak transforma-
tion to qualify as parody, . . . we weaken the protection of copyright.
And underprotection of copyright disserves the goals of copyright just
as much as overprotection, by reducing the financial incentive to
create.”242
On remand, the lower court was supposed to examine whether the
plaintiff’s markets had indeed been harmed, but the case was eventu-
ally settled. By all means, Campbell suggests that even when the sec-
ondary use amounts to artistic expression or some other form of
commentary, it is important to avoid the “parodic or satiric appropria-
tion” of earlier works.243
Satire is distinguished from parody for it does not target the origi-
nal work. Rather it uses a pre-existing work as a means to comment
upon something or someone else. Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin
239. Id. at 588–89.
240. Id. at 591–92.
241. Richard A. Posner, When Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 71–72
(1992); Beth Warnken Van Hecke, But Seriously, Folks: Toward a Coherent Stan-
dard of Parody as Fair Use, 77 MINN. L. REV. 465 (1992) (arguing that assessing
the potential substitution effect of a parody would allow for a more balanced fair
use analysis).
242. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599.
243. Cf. Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?: Notes on Market Failure and
the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 312 (1993) (arguing that a
proper fair use assessment should inquire upon whether “a reasonable market
transaction for the right to parody could be envisioned”). For the opposite view,
see Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of Libel, Trademark,
and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REV. 923 (1985); see also
NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 72, § 13.05[C][2] at 13-230.1-230.3 (noting that
the remand in Campbell should be read as an instruction by the court to thor-
oughly balance the equities involved in parody cases including copyright owner’s
rent seeking interests in possible derivative markets and suggesting that paro-
dists only won a “qualified victory” in Campbell); Anastasia P. Winslow, Rapping
on a Revolving Door: An Economic Analysis of Parody and Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 767 (1996) (recognizing that the likelihood of
a voluntary exchange is relevant to the assessment).
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Books U.S.A., Inc.244 concerned a children’s book titled The Cat in the
Hat, which was written by Theodor Geisel under the pseudonym of Dr.
Seuss. The main character of the book is a tall and mischievous an-
thropomorphic cat, who wears a tall hat with red and white stripes
and a bow tie while carrying an umbrella. Out of the blue, the Cat
enters the lives of Sally and her unnamed brother to entertain them
with its tricks. This book was one of a series aimed at enhancing ele-
mentary school literacy. The defendant’s book, The Cat NOT in the
Hat! A Parody by Dr. Juice, imitated the punchy style of the original
work using rhymes and simple words to satirize O.J. Simpson’s per-
spective as a person indicted for his wife’s murder. Its cover features
O.J. Simpson wearing the distinctive hat of Geisel’s Cat and looking
apathetic while holding a pair of blood-dripping football gloves.245
Satire does not target the original work for the sake of adding to it
a new expression or meaning, but rather appropriates copyrighted ex-
pression to lampoon an issue of social, political, or economic life. Com-
pared with parody, satire has a weaker claim to fair use, as it does not
require the same degree of transformative contribution.246 Copyright
owners are less inclined to suppress the emergence of a licensing mar-
ket for satiric products while third parties are not reliant on a given
copyrighted work to make a satirical publication. Balancing the equi-
ties involved, the court reached the conclusion that—based on a corre-
lation of the first and the fourth factors—the defendant’s derivative
use was not fair because of its commercial character, from which the
court inferred that market substitution, and therefore market harm,
was imminent.247 In effect, the decision creates a negligence standard
that permits satire but imposes a duty on third parties to exercise care
so as to avoid the hampering of authorial incentives by seeking to de-
rive profit through the satiric appropriation of copyrighted works.
A line of demarcation between parody and satire would not always
be easy to draw. At any rate, the decision of the Ninth Circuit in Dr.
Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books U.S.A. is in line with the proposi-
tion put forward by the Supreme Court in Campbell, namely that a
weak transformation might guise an attempt of “satiric
appropriation.”248
Some of those who have a bone to pick with a copyrighted work
because they feel in some way offended by it would be on the lookout
for ways of expressing disagreement with its content. With respect to
books or movies, for instance, a particularly effective means for
244. Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394 (9th Cir.
1997).
245. Id. at 1396–97.
246. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 580–81.
247. Dr. Seuss Enters., 109 F.3d at 1403.
248. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 599.
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achieving this laudable aim is to recast the story told in the original
work to be reflective of their own perspective. Critical recasts are
rather unlikely to develop market substitution effects in relation to
the original work. Hence, the amount and/or substantiality of the ele-
ments taken from the prior work constitute the most important pa-
rameters for setting the standard of due care. When applying the fair
use doctrine, the courts have consistently refrained from imposing du-
ties of care that require third parties to copy, both in quantitative and
qualitative terms, less than what is necessary for taking a hand in
such transformative critique.
In Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,249 the allegedly infring-
ing novel, The Wind Done Gone, retold the story of Gone with the Wind
from the perspective of a black slave. The defendant’s work hinged on
the original’s storyline and featured, verbatim, some of its dialogues.
While reviewing the third factor, the Eleventh Circuit noted that
there was no principle confining the copying of works protected by cop-
yright for criticism purposes to the elements required for “conjuring
up” the original.250 Equally, fair use analysis could not give rise to a
duty for parodists not to appropriate some central part of a given work
that could be perceived as its “heart.”251
Other sorts of critical commentary would be exempted from liabil-
ity even when the defendant is iteratively copying elements from sev-
eral works of the same author in order to write a critical biography of
the latter. Aggrieved at the experiences allegedly sustained as a mem-
ber of the Church of Scientology, Jonathan Caven-Atack offered his
own condemnatory views on the life and times of the late L. Ron Hub-
bard, the man who founded that religious organization.252 His inten-
tion was to show the author’s claimed true colors as a “paranoid,
vindictive, power hungry, petty sadist and profoundly disturbed man”
but also to expose Scientology as a “dangerous cult.”253 For this pur-
pose, Caven-Atack had extensively borrowed materials from Hub-
bard’s earlier works, collectively 121 passages from forty-eight
copyrighted resources, to write his book A Piece of Blue Sky:
Scientology, Dianetics and L. Ron Hubbard Exposed. Nevertheless, his
productive use of the copyrighted material was deemed fair because
the amount copied was proportional to the purpose of authoring a crit-
ical biography.254
249. Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
250. Id. at 1271–74.
251. Id. at 1273–74.
252. New Era Publ’ns Intern., ApS v. Carol Publ’g Grp., 904 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1990).
253. Id. at 154.
254. Id. at 158–59.
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C. News Reporting
Within the meaning of section 107 of the Copyright Act, the term
“news reporting” has been interpreted to encompass not only the cov-
erage of contemporary social events but also the disclosure of any pub-
lic interest information. News reporting is another kind of activity
that should be subjected to a different standard than the strict liabil-
ity regime governing the general prohibition of trespass upon copy-
right property. Furthermore, the duties of care imposed on news
reporters cannot be identical to those required by other types of secon-
dary users such as appropriation artists. Hence, news reporting
should be perceived a separate activity from the perspective of an eco-
nomic analysis.
One particular feature of this activity is that in many instances the
news reporter cannot dispense with verbatim copying of an earlier
work when that work simply constitutes the information that should
be disseminated. Swatch Group Management Services Ltd. v. Bloom-
berg L.P. provides us with an illustrative example.255 A newshound
working for the defendant managed to sneak into a teleconference
during which the plaintiff’s officials discussed with various financial
analysts the earnings report that the Swatch Group had submitted to
the Swiss exchange in compliance with their obligations pursuant to
Swiss securities law.256 Contrary to the directive provided to the par-
ticipants insisting on the call not being recorded for publication or
broadcast, Bloomberg’s employee managed to obtain a recording of
it.257 When the defendant made its recording available to the sub-
scribers of “Bloomberg Professional,” the plaintiff filed suit for in-
fringement of the copyright in the recording of the teleconference that
a provider of audio-conferencing services had prepared for them in the
meantime at their request.258 Reaching the point where the defen-
dant’s claim of fair use had to be assessed, the Second Circuit noted
that in spite of the secondary use being commercial and non-trans-
formative, the broader public interest in the timely access to accurate
business and financial news by investors should be given
prominence.259
For the same reason, the court did not consider the defendant’s bad
faith which had manifested itself in the use of “clandestine methods”
to elicit the relevant data.260 Inducing the optimal activity levels for
those collecting information that is valuable to the public presupposes
some degree of tolerance toward practices a saint would consider con-
255. Swatch Grp. Mgmt. Servs. Ltd. v. Bloomberg L.P., 742 F.3d 17 (2d Cir. 2014).
256. Id. at 22–23.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 23.
259. Id. at 28–29.
260. Id. at 26–27.
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troversial. Of course, the lack of a competitive relationship between
the parties to the dispute and the absence of any intent on the plain-
tiff’s behalf to commercially exploit its recording co-determined the
outcome in Swatch Group.261
Additional care must be exercised toward the legitimate interests
of news purveyors that make profit by selling information to broad-
casters and other reporters. If reporting organizations were left unbri-
dled to interfere with those core licensing markets at will, the
incentives of independent agencies to gather news would whittle
away. During the 1992 Rodney King riots, the broadcast reporters
who founded the Los Angeles News Service (LANS) captured video
footage of the attack on Reginald Denny from a news helicopter.262 As
a result of the video being broadcasted live, the victim’s life was
spared by a civilian who was able to come to the rescue just in time.
The two copyrighted videos created by LANS appeared under a li-
cense in NBC’s Today Show. The defendants, who had a news supply
agreement with NBC News Overseas and were provided with a copy of
the show, made their own videotape of the incident using a small por-
tion of the earlier works, which they then transmitted to their sub-
scribers via satellite in Europe and Africa.263 LANS sought to recover
damages attributed to those domestic acts of infringement that gave
way to the commercial exploitation of the earlier work abroad.264
Here, the turning point for negating fair use was the substantiality of
the part copied by the defendant, which was enough in qualitative
terms to allow for the usurpation of the market for the original.265 The
defendants had appropriated the “heart” of LANS’s videos, the parts
that really mattered.266 For sure, the non-transformative and com-
mercial nature of the secondary use spoke in favor of the defendant as
well.267 It seems, though, that whenever the courts are assessing
whether the defendant has exercised due care in that particular mar-
ket context, the most important aspect to consider is the interference
with the plaintiff’s core licensing markets by appropriating copy-
righted material of such quality or quantity that those markets are
actually harmed.268
261. Id. at 27–28.
262. L.A. News Serv. v. KCAL-TV Channel 9, 108 F.3d 1119, 1120 (9th Cir. 1997).
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. at 1122.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 1121–22.
268. Id. at 1122–23. News clipping service providers have been held liable for infring-
ing earlier copyrights by selling to their customers copies of expressive content
reporting news despite the transformative nature of the secondary use involved
since those defendants clearly interfere with markets where news gatherers are
supposed to seek rents. Pac. & S. Co., Inc. v. Duncan, 744 F.2d 1490, 1495 (11th
Cir. 1984) (denying fair use on the grounds of the secondary use being of an un-
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The judicial treatment of news reporting either under copyright or
under unfair competition laws lays particular emphasis on the licens-
ing culture pervasive in an industry, which involves tacit agreements
between market players to cover the cost of reporting through the
sharing of news gathered.269 Judges would often resort to custom
when lacking the information necessary for setting optimal negligence
standards.
Essentially the same standard of care was applied some years later
when Courtroom Television Networks (Court TV) plucked a nine-sec-
ond part of LANS’s videos where Damien Williams is depicted throw-
ing a brick on Reginald Denny’s head and incorporated it in the teaser
spots as well as the introductory montage for its show Prime Time
Justice.270 The defendants were now covering the trial of Denny’s as-
saulters. There is a temporal dimension to the duties of care owed to
news purveyors since news is normally only sellable within the nar-
row time lag between the moment a journalist discovers an issue and
the point where the relevant information is disseminated. Moreover,
the parties to the dispute were not competing on the delivery of “hot
news” of the same sort. Therefore, the defendants’ dealing with the
earlier work was not likely to usurp the demand for LANS’s copy-
righted videos as a historical documentation of the 1992 events.271
Regarding the third factor, the court found the amount taken to be
substantial—for it was composed of the most recognizable frames of
the video—but nevertheless quite small.272 LANS could not persua-
sively argue that the defendants had appropriated its works’ “heart”
because in the previous litigation against Reuters it had identified a
part lasting forty seconds as being the “core” of the earlier works.273
Court TV argued that it only took what was necessary for its intended
use, namely, to effectively cover the Williams and Watson trial and
also to promote their program to potential viewers. Weighing the brev-
ity of the portion taken against its significance, the court concluded
that the third factor appeared neutral.274 Hence, the defendant didn’t
poach enough material from the earlier work to harm LANS’s core
market for the video footage as historical artifact or to usurp the de-
mand for its rebounded newsworthiness.
productive nature and despite the fact that the plaintiff had not been marketing
its news broadcasts in the meantime); Associated Press v. Meltwater U.S. Hold-
ings, Inc., 931 F. Supp. 2d 537 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (rejecting an analogy between
crawlers that extract as well as download content from news websites and search
engines, but recognizing that news clipping entails a transformative purpose).
269. Cf. Int’l News Serv. v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235–36 (1918).
270. L.A. News Serv. v. CBS Broad., Inc., 305 F.3d 924 (9th Cir. 2002).
271. Id. at 941.
272. Id. at 940.
273. Id. at 940–41.
274. Id. at 941.
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The Ninth Circuit examined, as it was legally obliged to do, the
other factors as well. It turned out that the second factor also favored
fair use.275 Even if one recognized some creative input in the record-
ing of the videos, it remained that the earlier works were of a factual
and informational nature. To some extent, the secondary use was
transformative, or at least more transformative than that of the de-
fendants in Reuters, since Court TV edited the earlier works and
placed them into a new creative context within its show’s introductory
video, which also served the different purpose of promoting that TV
program.276 On the other hand, the use of LANS’s works in the teaser
videos was obviously less transformative.277 The defendant’s use was
largely commercial.278 It was observed that the more transformative
of the two uses was also the one being more intensively driven by com-
mercial motivation.279 Transformativeness and commercialism oper-
ated as cohesive forces cancelling each other out for the purposes of
the fair use analysis, prompting the court to rule that the first factor
weighted only weakly in favor of fair use.280 With the third factor be-
ing neutral and the rest of the factors favoring the defendant, the
court had no reservation whatsoever to accept that the secondary use
was fair. The opinion drew the various correlations between the fair
use variables.281
From the court’s conclusion, it appears that the factual nature of
the earlier work constitutes the most influential parameter for assess-
ing news reporting cases. This makes sense. News is not subject mat-
ter protectable by copyright as such. On the other hand, the requisite
level of care is primarily determined by reference to the variables as-
sociated with the third and the fourth factor. In the context of news
reporting, the secondary use does not have to be greatly transforma-
tive. And reporting organizations enjoy broad leeway to appropriate
copyrighted material for their journalistic purposes in terms of both
quality and quantity as long as the plaintiff’s core markets are not
harmed.
Shortly after Joyce Giraud won the title of “Miss Puerto Rico Uni-
verse,” a local television channel showed old pictures of her taken by
photographer Sixto Nu´n˜ez.282 A controversy arose as to whether the
photos were appropriate for a lady bearing such a title since the young
model posed naked or nearly naked for at least one of those photos.283
275. Id. at 940.
276. Id. at 938.
277. Id.
278. Id. at 939.
279. Id. at 939–40.
280. Id. at 940.
281. Id. at 942.
282. Nu´n˜ez v. Caribbean Int’l. News Corp., 235 F.3d 18, 21 (1st Cir. 2000).
283. Id.
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Nu´n˜ez sued El Vocero, the Puerto Rican newspaper that published
those photos, for copyright infringement.284
Turning to evaluate the fair use defense, the court found that the
secondary use was commercially motivated, to a large extent, as the
newspaper put the photos on the front page to raise interest in its
product.285 At the same time, the defendant’s dealing with the earlier
works was informative, transforming those photos so as to obtain a
further purpose not envisaged by their author. In fact, the newspaper
satisfied the demand of the relevant public having a genuine interest
in the competition for information about the titleholder’s personal-
ity.286 Even though El Vocero copied entire earlier works, this was
still proportional to the informational purpose of the secondary use.287
There was no way, of course, to effectively cover the controversy other
than showing the complete photos that had fueled the debate. This led
the court to the conclusion that the third factor was not particularly
relevant to the case at hand.288 Furthermore, the court was convinced
that the newspaper did not artificially create a “news story” to appro-
priate the copyrighted photos for commercial purposes.289 Rather, it
genuinely sought to feed the public with the type of news it was eager
to consume.
The defendant’s good faith was evident.290 Those lawfully acquired
photos had been properly attributed to their author. Evidence did not
suggest that El Vocero had any intention of competing with Nu´n˜ez or
preventing him from exercising his right of first publication as the
earlier works had already featured on TV shows. The plaintiff was not
able to cast any doubt on the truthfulness of the defendant’s allegation
that the photos were published in the honest belief that anyone could
freely circulate them after the fuss made about the photo shoot taken
before Giraud’s elevation to stardom.
The latter point implied also that Nu´n˜ez’s works were primarily
directed at evidencing Giraud’s suitability to act as a model without
the photographer seeking hereby to express himself artistically. Right
from the start, the photos were conceived as part of a modelling
portfolio.
Harm to the market for professional photographs used for display
in newspapers was not substantial, if there was any harm at all.291 El
Vocero’s low-resolution reproduction on its front page was “simply an
284. Id.
285. Id. at 22.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 24.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 22–23.
290. Id. at 23.
291. Id. at 25.
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inadequate substitute for an 8 ? x 10 ? glossy.”292 And, in any event,
Nu´n˜ez did not seek any profit in the first place since he agreed to do a
favor to Giraud’s agent and offered his services gratuitously.293 Mar-
ket harm was only conceivable in the narrower market for photo-
graphs sold to newspapers for illustrating controversy.294 But Nu´n˜ez
had voluntarily dispensed with the potential economic benefits deriva-
ble from the copyrights in suit, which simply meant that no cognizable
market harm could be recognized.295
The court rightfully proceeded to assess the proper standard of
care toward the interests of other photographers who might enter into
such transactions with news reporters. To do so, it sought to examine
the impact that widespread conduct analogous to El Vocero’s practices
would have on that narrowly defined market. Noting that “the market
for professional photographs of models publishable only due to the
controversy of the photograph itself is [surely] small or non-existent,”
the opinion indicates that it would be difficult for copyright owners to
win the fourth factor invoking this argument.296 Most likely, the re-
duction of the incentives package involved is not, in economic terms,
so substantial as to outweigh the social benefit derived from secondary
uses committed for news reporting purposes. With all fair use factors
favoring the defendants, the court inevitably ruled that El Vocero had
not engaged in copyright infringement.297
As already indicated, the delineation of a relevant market serves
the purpose of determining the part of the incentives package that
should be foregone in case the fair use defense is affirmed.298 Through
this determination, a court can properly balance the social cost of
lower incentives due to a decrease in the amount of internalized bene-
fits against the social benefits accruing from the secondary use. It is a
market definition directed at promoting the goals of copyright policy
through an appropriate demarcation of the copyright’s scope. Another
interesting feature of Nu´n˜ez v. El Vocero is the illustration of the no-
tion that the duty of care owed to the copyright owner might vary ac-
cording to the situation of the particular plaintiff. In addition, Nu´n˜ez’s
fee-waiver can be perceived as a conscious failure to exercise care to-
ward his own economic interests.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 25 n.3.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See infra section IV.D.
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D. Private/Personal Uses
The exoneration of at least some private or personal uses from lia-
bility is vital for upholding the congressional mandate to promote the
progress of science. Widespread knowledge dissemination does not
simply amount to a function of the amount of authorial works that
copyright protection incites but it equally depends upon the manner in
which the consumer is able to interact with the produced works during
the copyright term. Some degree of autonomy in consumption is neces-
sary, for instance, so that the consumer is able to fully enjoy the musi-
cal works he or she has lawfully acquired and to absorb its cultural
value efficiently.299
Imagine someone who is not allowed to make copies of his or her
CDs and save them onto the memory of his or her personal stereo.
Often, the full value of a cultural good is better appreciated through
discourse and debate that occurs in the context of collective or shared
consumption.300 Think, for instance, of a group of schoolmates passing
to each other a movie of a type they particularly like with the aim of
exchanging views and ideas about a given subject, or consider a group
of individuals reflecting on the social issues raised in a documentary
they have all watched together on DVD. As a matter of personal need
in self-expression, consumers have an interest in being free to engage
in transformative reproductions of an earlier work. Consider a kid or
an adult drawing pictures of heroes featured in RPG games while com-
bating each other, for instance. A young artist may systematically
copy the work of contemporary painters at home in an attempt to
learn from the masters. All the aforementioned uses promote both
knowledge dissemination and incremental authorship. Some other
uses, such as the whistling of a copyrighted tune in the bathroom,
have a bearing on the individual’s sphere of privacy.
It goes without saying that we need the activity levels of personal
and private uses to be particularly high. But again, even those activi-
ties may occasionally prove to be hazardous to the integrity of the cop-
yright system in some contexts, which makes the provision for specific
standards of care necessary.
The starting point of the analysis is the Supreme Court’s decision
in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.301 Ultimately,
the dispute turned upon whether the distribution of an analog video-
cassette recorder rendered Sony indirectly liable for reproductions
299. Joseph P. Liu, Copyright Law’s Theory of the Consumer, 44 B.C. L. REV. 397,
406–11 (2003) (arguing that copyright law should recognize the interests of con-
sumers who are more active in dealing with a work of authorship).
300. Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1871 (2007) (exploring the
various types of personal uses and cautioning against suppression of consumer
interests through over-enforcement of copyrights).
301. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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made by consumers who had created copies of TV programs to watch
them at a time of their convenience in the privacy of their home.
Sony’s liability was contingent upon a finding that those copies were
illegal with the ultimate question being whether such private copying
amounted to fair use. A divided Supreme Court ruled that such pri-
vate and non-commercial copying of TV programs for the purposes of
time-shifting qualifies as fair use.302 In the majority’s view, private
and non-commercial uses should be deemed presumptively fair, shift-
ing the burden of proof to the copyright owner who should establish
that the exemption of a specific use would undermine the incentives
that copyright is supposed to secure by harming his or her markets.303
Sony was only able to provide speculative evidence of such
harm.304 Copies made by consumers would normally be erased after
the program had been watched and there was no culture of such video-
tapes being shared and copied among large groups of individuals.
Hence, there was no palpable possibility of the private copies made by
Betamax users substituting for Universal City Studio’s works.305 In
other words, there was no indication that time-shift copying of TV pro-
grams with the assistance of the Betamax device was likely to have
any adverse effect on the plaintiff’s markets.306
According to the Ninth Circuit, creating copies of MP3 files stored
on a computer’s hard drive to render one’s own music portable consti-
tuted a “paradigmatic non-commercial personal use entirely consis-
tent with the purposes of the Act.”307 Rio, the first portable MP3
player, incorporated exactly that function, which made it possible for
users to space-shift musical files they lawfully owned.308 The main
issue in dispute was whether the distribution of Rio had violated the
obligation to introduce anti-copying protection measures and comply
with royalty payment requirements imposed by the Audio Home Re-
cording Act (AHRA). Liability did not arise because Rio was not in fact
a digital audio recording device to which the AHRA was applicable—it
was not capable of reproducing a digital music recording indirectly
from a transmission.309 Nevertheless, the court adamantly confirmed
302. Id. at 455–56.
303. Id. at 450–51.
304. Id. at 454.
305. Id. at 452–53.
306. Stan J. Liebowitz, The Economics of Betamax: Unauthorized Copying of Adver-
tising Based Television Broadcasts (June 1985) (unpublished abstract) (on file
with the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.342741 [https://
perma.unl.edu/S9KJ-SXJL] (highlighting the fact that the use of VCRs did not
have a significant effect on the advertising revenues of the television broadcast-
ers since those devices did not offer effective means for avoiding commercials).
307. Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Diamond Multimedia Sys., Inc., 180 F.3d 1072,
1079 (9th Cir. 1999).
308. Id. at 1079.
309. Id. at 1081.
2018] FAIR USE AS REGULATION OF ACTIVITY LEVELS 445
the general principle that such personal uses are fair and copyright
liability would not attach to the marketing of devices that simply facil-
itate them.
In the same spirit, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the sale of Game
Genie, an add-on product that enabled users of the Nintendo En-
tertainment System (NES) to interfere with the game and effectuate a
series of modifications to the video games, did not infringe Nintendo’s
copyrights.310 By use of some code the gamer could, for instance,
render his or her character invincible in battle.311 Assessing infringe-
ment, the court held that the private uses involved did not give rise to
derivative works.312 This was because no permanent copies of the au-
diovisual displays created through Game Genie could be made.313 In
addition, the allegedly infringing product did not alter the data stored
in the game cartridges but simply interfered with the flow of data be-
tween a given game cartridge and the central processing unit of
NES.314 Notwithstanding it being unnecessary for deciding the case,
the court moved on to affirm that gamers were engaging in fair uses of
the earlier works since what they were doing was analogous to “skip-
ping portions of copyrighted works or viewing denouements before
climaxes.”315
Regardless of how welfare-enhancing private and personal uses
may be, the levels of those activities should not be excessive. Increased
shared consumption, for instance, might indeed harm the markets for
the original work. This is particularly evident in the case of P2P file-
sharing.316 Virtually limitless as it may be, the free consumptive use
that takes place within file-sharing networks is a menace to the mar-
ket for recorded music. Even if peer-to-peer file-sharing technology en-
hanced consumers’ autonomy in consumption by allowing them to
store their MP3 files in an alternative medium or facilitating the
purchasing choices of consumers by enabling them to sample music
uploaded by other users, the fact that the copy is made available to an
infinite number of users is sufficient to render those otherwise desira-
ble uses dangerous activities from an economic perspective. Indirect
appropriability is not possible because the rights holder cannot iden-
tify those owners of lawful products who make copies to charge them a
higher price, while the strategy of charging a skyrocketing price for
the first copy would yield economic benefits lower than the profit-max-
imizing price since the price of the subsequent copies would drasti-
310. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992).
311. Id. at 967.
312. Id. at 967–69.
313. Id. at 968.
314. Id. at 967.
315. Id. at 971.
316. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001).
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cally decrease within a very short period of time.317 The Ninth Circuit
upheld the lower court’s findings that Napster harmed the plaintiff’s
traditional markets by reducing the sales of audio CDs among college
students and usurping the potential market for digital downloads of
its music.318
Despite the difficulty in assessing the exact effect of a secondary
use on the copyright owner’s markets that characterizes those
cases,319 the possibility of an error can be minimized by having re-
course to other methods for applying the law, such as analogy. Nap-
ster was clearly not analogous to Sony’s VCR or Diamond’s Rio MP3
player, which did not involve extensive distribution of copyrighted ma-
terial to the public.320 Even if the possibility of error cannot be ex-
cluded, the Ninth Circuit imposed a reasonable rule-like standard of
care to the defendants.
317. Benjamin Klein, Andres V. Lerner & Kevin M. Murphy, The Economics of Copy-
right “Fair Use” in a Networked World, 92 AM. ECON. REV. 205, 206–07 (2002).
318. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1016–17.
319. Liebowitz, Back to the Future, supra note 97. In another subsequent study,
Liebowitz concluded that there is strong evidence of file-sharing harming the mu-
sic industry. Stan J. Liebowitz, File-Sharing: Creative Destruction or Just Plain
Destruction?, 49 J.L. & ECON. 1 (2006); see also Thomas J. Miceli & Richard P.
Adelstein, An Economic Model of Fair Use, 18 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 359 (2006)
(setting as the basis of their analysis the assumption that some consumers would
not have been able to purchase the original if copying was impossible). Miceli and
Adelstein suggest that fair use should allow access to those users, arguing that
this would maximize social welfare because the secondary use benefits a group of
consumers without decreasing the welfare of copyright owners. Where a part of
the consuming public has the luxury of choosing between the options of purchas-
ing the original or obtaining a copy, courts would have to balance the potential
losses and gains in welfare that the stakeholders involved have to experience as a
result of the secondary use. Apparently, it would require a fairly good amount of
accurate market information, which would not always be readily available, to ef-
fectuate all those trade-offs. Some of the conflicting empirical research that has
been carried out examining the effect of file-sharing on the music industry is
summarized by HAROLD WINTER, ISSUES IN LAW AND ECONOMICS 46–58 (2017)
(arguing that while evidence does suggest some revenue losses for the rights
holders, copyright protection is not necessary because the remaining rents are
enough to generate incentives to produce creative works). To accept that argu-
ment, though, would be tantamount to adhering to the notion that IP rights func-
tion as incentive generating mechanisms that induce creativity by simply
allowing the recoupment of production costs and some reasonable profit rather
than by securing a profit-maximizing opportunity. See Mark A. Lemley, Property,
Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1064–65 (2005) (ar-
guing that IP rights make economic sense only to the extent necessary to enable
creators to cover their average fixed costs plus a reasonable investment return).
In his review of the relevant economic studies, Liebowitz concludes that internet
piracy has substantially harmed both the music and the movie industry. See Stan
J. Liebowitz, The Impacts of Internet Piracy, in HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF
COPYRIGHT – A GUIDE FOR STUDENTS AND TEACHERS 225 (Richard Watt ed., 2014).
320. A&M Records, 239 F.3d at 1019.
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The argument based on analogy protects the reliance investments
of authors. It also goes in tandem with the general principle of secur-
ing incentives for creative activity by granting evidentiary easements
to the copyright owner with respect to a properly defined subject mat-
ter of property to provide authors with meaningful protection. Fur-
thermore, analogy has the potential of minimizing the possibility of
error and creating principles, which despite their possible shortcom-
ings, at least allow for some increased efficiencies in the allocation of
resources by prompting stakeholders to coordinate their behavior ac-
cording to some legal rule-like standard. Most importantly, a light-
handed application of the fair use defense at the early stage where
controversy arises about the legality of a specific type of dealing with
earlier works is likely to interfere with the formation of markets for
that secondary use.321 The cumulative precedential effect of Sony and
Napster gives rise to a legal landscape where both the interests of cop-
yright owners and the interests of the public in private/personal deal-
ings with earlier works find consideration.
E. Appropriation Art
Many works of authorship would eventually morph into short-
hands for a range of meanings after having become the subject matter
of social discourse.322 By exempting the use of earlier works as ciphers
for one’s own expressive purposes from copyright liability, the fair use
doctrine secures the unhindered participation of third parties in soci-
ocultural affairs and promotes a social interaction that is abundant in
colorful means of expression.
In Blanch v. Koons,323 a fashion photographer sought to assert a
copyright claim in one of her works titled the Silk Sandals. The photo-
graph depicted the pair of a female’s lower legs and feet wearing san-
dals as they were resting crossed at the lap of a male model in an
airplane cabin.324 Koons, a pop artist, used the depiction of those feet
and shoes as one of the collage elements contained in his oil painting
Niagara.325 As the artist himself explained in an affidavit that he sub-
mitted to the district court, the reason why he decided to juxtapose
women’s legs against a backdrop of food and landscape was because he
intended to “comment on the ways in which some of our most basic
appetites – for food, play, and sex – are mediated by popular
images.”326 By re-contextualizing those specific fragments of the ear-
321. MERGES, supra note 68, at 250–52.
322. Michael Spence, Justifying Copyright, in DEAR IMAGES: ART, COPYRIGHT AND CUL-
TURE 394–95 (Karsten Schubert & Daniel McClean eds., 2002).
323. Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2006).
324. Id. at 247.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 247.
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lier work, Koons tried to “compel the viewer to break out of the con-
ventional way of experiencing a particular appetite as mediated by
mass media.”327
Satisfied that the defendant had afforded a cogent explanation for
using copyrighted material, the Second Circuit noted that Koons’s col-
lage was driven by an expressive purpose different to the one that in-
cited the creation of the work from which the artist had borrowed
some creative parts. Hence, the junior use was deemed transforma-
tive.328 As regards the commercial nature of the defendant’s use, who
created the work under commission for exhibition in a German art
gallery, the court held that the commercialism of the use by the secon-
dary user was of less significance given that Niagara was a “substan-
tially transformative” work.329 Activities such as comment or criticism
are not incompatible with commercial profit. Commercialism would
normally allow those activities to persist and flourish even when the
copyright owner and third parties stand up and are counted against
the use of an earlier work as fodder for social commentary. Emphasis
was further placed on the public interest and in particular, the social
value generated by the public exhibition of art.330
Hence, the analysis of the first factor tilted the assessment toward
the affirmation of fair use.331 Similarly, the court regarded it as im-
material that Koons had drawn upon a copyrighted work of a creative
nature in light of the transformative character of his own work.332
Furthermore, both the quantity and value of the materials used were
found to be reasonable in relation to the purpose of the copying.333
Reviewing the fair use analysis of the Second Circuit, it appears
that using an earlier work as an expressive springboard in social com-
mentary constitutes an activity that should not be suppressed by copy-
right enforcement and therefore must be subjected to a negligence
standard. While the secondary user does not have to exercise care by
generally avoiding the use of creative material, he or she must refrain
from copying more than what is necessary to promote his or her ex-
pressive goals.
Getting to the fourth factor, the Second Circuit found that it does
not favor the copyright owner since Blanch had never licensed any of
her photographs for use in graphic or other visual arts and no other
harm to her career plans or to the value of Silk Sandals could be fore-
327. Id.
328. Id. at 252–53.
329. Id. at 254.
330. Id.
331. Id. at 256.
332. Id. at 256–57.
333. Id. at 257–58.
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boded.334 Generally speaking, third parties owe a duty of care not to
usurp the demand for the original work, including markets for deriva-
tive uses. However, the opinion of the court seems to suggest that ap-
propriation artists do not encroach upon the copyright owner’s
markets since the respective works normally target different audi-
ences and are sold in different markets. This indicates further that the
assessment of the fourth factor only considered the plaintiff’s tradi-
tional markets. As a result thereof, no proper balancing took place be-
tween the rent-seeking interests of the copyright owner and the social
benefits associated with the secondary use.
Blanch v. Koons was decided during the era where the transforma-
tive character of the secondary use was given prominence over the
other statutory factors.335 Case law and commentary of that time sug-
gested that the transformative nature of the junior use alone should,
in the general run of things, exonerate the appropriation artists from
liability without much further analysis.
Yet, excessive levels of creative activities in the field of appropria-
tion art may indeed cause social losses by undermining authors’ incen-
tives to produce works of authorship if they overabundantly interfere
with actual as well as potential licensing markets of the copyright
owner or significantly reduce the value of the earlier work. William
Landes has referred to a settled dispute between the photojournalist
Henri Dauman and Andy Warhol’s estate as an example thereof.336
The photographer is being held in high esteem for his iconic celebrity
portraits and many other photos, including a picture that captured the
mournful expression of Jacqueline Kennedy on the day of her hus-
band’s funeral. Seeking to document the historical events of his era in
his unique art, the famous pop artist cropped that photo, uprooting a
part focusing on Jackie’s face, which he then transposed onto canvas,
creating one of his four emblematic “silkscreen portraits” of her.
According to Landes, the fact that the estate reproduced Andy
Warhol’s silkscreen image on various merchandising products such as
calendars and posters should tilt not only the assessment of the fourth
factor but also the complete fair use analysis in favor of the plaintiff
since the defendant had obviously tapped into licensing markets cus-
334. Id. at 258.
335. See generally Jeannine M. Marques, Fair Use in the 21st Century: Bill Graham
and Blanch v. Koons, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 331 (2007) (linking the rise in sig-
nificance that transformativeness had gained in the meantime as a determinant
of the fair use calculus to copyright’s ultimate goal of promoting knowledge and
the arts); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Making Sense of Fair Use, 15 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 715 (2011) (arguing that Campbell signified the ascendancy of the “trans-
formative use paradigm,” which overshadowed the “market-centered paradigm”
represented by Harper & Row and other preceding cases).
336. William M. Landes, Copyright, Borrowed Images, and Appropriation Art: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (2000).
450 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 97:384
tomarily exploited by photographers. Furthermore, he argues, under
the said circumstances neither is the copyright owner inclined to pro-
hibit the secondary use nor does the appropriation artist lose incen-
tives to generate works of authorship, being mindful of how high the
market values his creations. No significant transaction costs or other
impediments are present which could prevent the parties from reach-
ing a mutually beneficial bargain. Things would have been different,
as Landes suggests, if the estate had transformed Dauman’s photo
only to create a single visual work or to a limited-edition series of
those “silkscreen prints.” In such a case, the cutback of the copyright
owner’s incentives package resulting from the loss of a licensing op-
portunity is offset by the social value that appropriation art engen-
ders, be it as a vehicle for social commentary or as a form of art in
itself.
The example shows that no matter how valuable their contribution
to social discourse might be, appropriation artists still owe some duty
of care to copyright owners that has to be specified by the courts.
Hence, the transformative character of the secondary use should
neither be dispositive nor awarded prominence in the sense of pre-
empting a full-blown fair use analysis or inviting a manipulation of its
factors. Courts should fastidiously analyze the remaining factors in-
cluding, of course, the market effects of the secondary use.
Quite often, it is actually the plaintiff who fails to adduce adequate
information about the licensing of his or her work as the case was in
Seltzer v. Green Day.337 In that case, the defendant punk rock band
used in one of the backdrop videos they projected during their stage
shows a copy of plaintiff’s Scream Icon, a drawing which had been re-
produced on posters and stickers hanging throughout the neighbor-
hoods of Los Angeles by way of street art.338
While the exact message conveyed by Dereck Seltzer’s work could
not be readily extrapolated, the Ninth Circuit accepted that the de-
fendants had indeed added their own expressive content since the
song, in connection to which the earlier work had been used, was
meant to cast aspersions on the “hypocrisy of some religious people
who preach one thing but act otherwise” and denounce the “violence
that is done in the name of religion.”339 There was no indication what-
soever that the plaintiff’s work somehow adverted to the same theme.
Rather, the Scream Icon came across as a “directionless anguished
screaming face.”340 Thus, the court found that the junior use was
transformative.341
337. 725 F.3d 1170 (9th Cir. 2013).
338. Id. at 1174.
339. Id.
340. Id. at 1177.
341. Id. at 1176.
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Reviewing the analysis of the court, it appears that the latent eco-
nomic rationale for accepting the fair use defense in the case at hand
lies in the fact that the defendant has exercised due care toward the
legitimate interests of the copyright owner. First of all, the secondary
use was only incidentally commercial since the band did not use the
earlier work to promote its concerts, CDs, or other merchandise.
Scream Icon was used in a four-minute video running in the back-
ground while the song East Jesus Nowhere was performed. A large,
red “spray-painted” cross was superimposed on the middle of the
screaming face and dominated the video clip’s frame. The action takes
place at an accelerated pace in the surroundings of a brick alleyway
covered in graffiti depicting three defaced images of Jesus Christ. In
the course of several days, many other cognoscente of the same art
would drop by to put their own touch to the scene. Despite those
changes made to the drawing by Staub, the video-designer, the earlier
work was identifiable. Therefore, the Scream Icon was primarily re-
sorted to as an expressive shortcut with any commercial aspects asso-
ciated with its use being simply incidental.342
Obviously, Green Day’s quasi-commercial use did not substitute for
the original, which was primarily envisaged by its creator as a piece of
street art some time ago.343 Since no traditional markets such as
those related to general merchandise products were harmed, and the
plaintiff did not provide any evidence of likelihood that he would de-
velop any further markets for his work, the defendants could avail
themselves of the fair use defense to escape liability.344
The court did not examine whether “reasonable or potential mar-
kets” were harmed. Given that the copyright incentives package seeks
to internalize benefits that would allow authors to capitalize upon the
full market value of their works, a detailed consideration of the copy-
right owner’s rent-seeking opportunities should form part of every fair
use assessment. Of course, even if the copyright owner is successful in
showing that the analysis of the fourth factor favors his or her position
to a larger or lesser degree, this does not really mean that he or she is
guaranteed an easy victory on the fair use argument. It rather means
that any harm sustained with respect to those markets should be bal-
anced against the contribution of the secondary use to social welfare.
In Seltzer, for instance, even if we assume that the photographer
should obtain benefits from an unforeseen exploitation method for his
work, any harm would be minimal since the drawing was used only for
a very short video during the tour of a music group.
The important intuition emanating from the analysis of the Ninth
Circuit in this case is that the transformative nature of the earlier
342. Id. at 1175–78.
343. Id. at 1179.
344. Id.
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work is not dispositive and that courts should throw themselves into a
careful balance of the individual and collective equities stumbling
across each other in a given copyright dispute.345 No matter how
transformative and socially desirable their activities are, appropria-
tion artists do owe a duty of care to copyright owners.346 Such duty
may also arise with respect to the value of the earlier work.
345. In my view, the arguments brought forward by Merges, supra note 243, with re-
spect to parodic secondary uses, apply mutatis mutandis to the case of appropria-
tion art. Cf. John Carlin, Culture Ventures: Artistic Appropriation and
Intellectual Property Law, 13 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 103 (1988); Brittani Ever-
son, The Narrowest and Most Obvious Limits: Applying Fair Use to Appropriation
Art Economically Using a Royalty System, 63 CATH. U. L. REV. 729 (2014) (sug-
gesting that the institution of a royalty system would do justice to the legitimate
interests of both copyright owners and appropriation artists); Marci A. Hamilton,
Appropriation Art and the Imminent Decline in Authorial Control over Copy-
righted Works, 42 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 93 (1994) (advocating the introduc-
tion of a liability rule); John Carl Zwisler, (Mis)appropriation Art:
Transformation and Attribution in the Fair Use Doctrine, 15 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 163, 190–92 (2016) (arguing that the emphasis should be placed on the
fourth factor, but the plaintiff should be required to establish the likelihood of
entering the market where the secondary use has taken place).
346. One of the challenges that appropriation art poses to the copyright system is the
problem of weeding out those cases where the defendant pretentiously alleges
that the secondary use conveys some sort of social commentary to justify an at-
tempt to gain commercial profit from an earlier work. In Rogers v. Koons, the
same appropriation artist was sued for copyright infringement for creating a
sculpture entitled “String of Puppies” based on a black-and-white photo made by
the plaintiff, which depicted a man and woman seated on a bench, holding eight
puppies in their arms. 960 F.2d 301, 304 (2d Cir. 1992). The later work emerged
after Koons directed artisans to copy many details from the original work and
effectuate perceptible changes such as adding flowers to the heads of the models
and exaggerating the puppies’ noses. Id. at 304–05. The defendant’s fair use de-
fense was rejected with the argument that the secondary use fell short of being a
parody, meaning that, in the view of the court, the claim to a transformative
contribution benefitting the public was weak. Id. at 308–12. The court was actu-
ally concerned with the fair use defense ending up having no practical limits if
defendants like Koons were able to argue that they were “acting within an artis-
tic tradition of commenting upon the commonplace.” Id. at 310. The decision has
been subjected to criticism because it failed to consider that there is social benefit
in using earlier works as fodders for social commentary even if the later works
are not parodies in the legal sense. See E. Kenly Ames, Beyond Rogers v. Koons: A
Fair Use Standard for Appropriation, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1473, 1506 (1993); Rox-
ana Badin, An Appropriate(d) Place in Transformative Value: Appropriation Art’s
Exclusion from Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 60 BROOK. L. REV. 1653
(1995); Lynne A. Greenberg, The Art of Appropriation: Puppies, Piracy, and Post-
Modernism, 11 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 29–30 (1992). What is probably
there to take from Rogers is the notion that in the absence of a palpable social
benefit, the first factor, and also the overall fair use analysis, would tend to favor
the plaintiff. The Second Circuit was probably not really convinced by the artist’s
claims that he intended his work to suggest that “the mass production of com-
modities and media images has caused a deterioration in the quality of society”
and to critically comment upon the earlier work as well as “the political and eco-
nomic system that created it.” Rogers, 960 F.2d at 309. Arguably, the social bene-
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In Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC,347 the defendant, an apparel
manufacturer, isolated the face of the mayor of Madison, Wisconsin,
Paul R. Soglin, from a photo taken by his photographer and re-contex-
tualized it as an element featured on t-shirts and tank tops that were
eventually sold at the local Mifflin Street Block Party.348 Sconnie Na-
tion’s clothing featured the mayor’s face as separated out of Michael
Kienitz’s photograph, albeit in a lime green color surrounded by the
phrase “Sorry for partying” written in multi-color script.349 The defen-
dant’s use was deemed transformative in light of the political criticism
it exerted on the previous initiatives undertaken by the municipal
government official to shut down the annual event.350 Importantly,
the Seventh Circuit rejected the notion of transformativeness being
commensurate with the touchstone of the fair use analysis.351 Again,
the plaintiff did not give a shot to convince the court that the defen-
dant turned some plans of his to license the use of his photograph for
apparel upside-down. Nevertheless, Judge Easterbook, on his own ini-
tiative, delved into the arguments that the photographer himself could
have put forward.352
At first, he called into question the necessity of using Michael
Kienitz’s photo for attaining its expressive purposes, pondering over
the reason behind such a choice when various other non-copyrighted
fit generated by the secondary use was not substantial or seemed to have been
overshadowed by the defendant’s commercial motivation. Hence, it is not surpris-
ing for the court to have argued that the defendant’s alleged creative intent could
not play the decisive role in assessing the transformative character of an appro-
priation artist’s work. Id. Apart from that, Koons appropriated, according to the
court, an amount of original expression that was disproportional to his expressive
purposes. Id. at 310. Last but not least, the appropriation artist was deemed to
have acted in bad faith because he had removed the copyright notice from plain-
tiff’s photo before handing it over to the artisans with instructions on how to
create the sculpture at issue. Id. at 309; Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 262 (2d
Cir. 2006) (Katzmann, J., concurring); see also Landes, supra note 336, at 21–22
(noting that where the appropriation artist creates more copies from a single
source, the case against fair use becomes stronger).
347. Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 766 F.3d 756 (7th Cir. 2014).
348. Id. at 757.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 758.
351. Id. As explained by the Seventh Circuit,
The Second Circuit has run with the suggestion and concluded that
“transformative use” is enough to bring a modified copy within the scope
of § 107. Cariou applied this to an example of “appropriation art,” in
which some of the supposed value comes from the very fact that the work
was created by someone else. We’re skeptical of Cariou’s approach, be-
cause asking exclusively whether something is “transformative” not only
replaces the list in § 107 but also could override 17 U.S.C. § 106(2),
which protects derivative works.
Id. (internal citation omitted) (citing Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694, 706 (2d Cir.
2013).
352. Id. at 759.
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alternatives, including snapshots, that the defendants could have
taken were available and capable of serving the same end.353 Whether
the costs of precaution, that is the limitation of the freedom to choose
befitting medium for the purposes of engaging in social commentary,
outweighs the cost of appropriating the copyright owner’s creative ef-
forts is an issue for the court to examine in light of the specific set of
facts that it has to evaluate. For instance, there might be a necessity
to use the copyrighted work involved in Kienitz according to the said
calculus since the relevant photo was taken at Soglin’s inauguration.
It may well be that some photos carry with them a certain symbolism
that makes them particularly apt for adaptation in later works taking
aim at exercising valuable social criticism.
Apart from an assessment of necessity, Judge Easterbrook
sketched the trajectory for devising theories of harm that copyright
owners could invoke against appropriation artists with respect to the
fourth factor. Accordingly, Judge Easterbrook referred to the possibil-
ity of celebrities not willing to work with Michael Kienitz for fear of
the photographs ordered being used against them subsequently be-
cause of their supreme quality.354
Fair use case law is leaving behind presumptions that turn upon
the commercial or transformative character of the use to focus on the
promulgation of socially optimal negligence standards. In effect, the
judge calls for the formulation of care duties owed by appropriation
artists to copyright owners.
However, this should not be taken to suggest that the expansion of
the tranformativeness concept to include uses that simply contribute
different aesthetics or simply alter the earlier work without adding
any ascertainable further meaning is wrong. Appropriation art is an
acclaimed form of artistic expression that should not be stymied by
overly far-reaching copyright claims. Since the courts have to imple-
ment negligence standards to keep the activity levels of appropriation
artists at an optimal level, they first have to recognize appropriation
art as an activity that should be subjected to a negligence standard in
the first place. Andy Warhol’s “silkscreen portraits” of JFK’s widow,
for instance, were rather aimed at enhancing the socially acknowl-
edged features of that public persona with no intention whatsoever to
either exercise criticism or to shed light on some other perceived as-
pects of her personality.
Another example highlighting the function of the first factor at the
stage where courts determine the type of socially desirable activity
before seeking to induce optimal levels of that activity through an ap-
propriate legal standard is the decision of the Second Circuit in the
353. Id.
354. Id.
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case of Cariou v. Prince.355 This was another case about a photogra-
pher taking umbrage at his work igniting the inspiration of an appro-
priation artist.
Back in 2000, the French photographer Patrick Cariou published a
photography book comprising many black and white photos of Ras-
tafarians living in isolated mountainous areas of Jamaica.356 The
book’s title Yes Rasta pertains to a personal greeting used by the
members of those communities. Cariou’s artistic endeavor was to cap-
ture the essence of that culture. The author managed to make friends
with them and gain enough of their trust to be allowed to carry out his
project within six years while living with them.357 Richard Prince
used many of those photos while promoting his own art. One charac-
teristic instance concerned alterations made to a picture depicting a
Rastafarian man in the wild. The appropriation artist turned him into
a player of electric guitar and placed splotches of blue paint atop his
eyes.358 This work was part of a collection titled “Canal Zone.”359
To appreciate the nature of the defendant’s creative efforts, the
opinion resorted to a definition provided by the Tate Gallery according
to which appropriation art entails “the more or less direct taking over
into a work of art a real object or even an existing work.”360 In the
view of the Second Circuit, the secondary use was transformative be-
cause it manifested an entirely different aesthetic from the earlier
work.361 In contrast to the classic portrait and landscape photography
found in Yes Rasta, Prince’s “crude and jarring” works are “hectic and
provocative.”362 Compared to the earlier work, Prince’s composition,
presentation, scale, color palette, and media were deemed by the court
to be different and new, giving rise to a clearly distinguishable expres-
sive disposition.363
355. Cariou v. Prince, 714 F.3d 694 (2d Cir. 2013).
356. Id. at 698.
357. Id. at 698–99.
358. Id. at 701.
359. Id. at 699–700.
360. Id. at 699.
361. Id. at 707–08.
362. Id. at 706.
363. Importantly, the court concluded that Prince’s work was transformative, despite
him conceding that he did not really have any message to convey through his
work. Id. at 707. What mattered instead was how the specific work appeared to
the reasonable observer. Id. Focusing on public perception is a proper approach to
ascertain the public benefit of the secondary use. Artists often refrain from pro-
viding explanations about the message conveyed by their works. They may not
feel obliged to. Alternatively, their artistic intention might have been to puzzle
the receivers of the communication and leave them with their thoughts regarding
some issue. In other instances, the interpretation of a work might be highly con-
textual or entail a significant amount of subjectivity. On these issues, see gener-
ally Laura A. Heymann, Everything Is Transformative: Fair Use and Reader
Response, 31 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 445, 455 (2008) (relying on literary theory for
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Hence, the expansion of the transformativeness criterion to encom-
pass secondary uses that neither offer a critical review of the earlier
work nor use it as fodder for social commentary, but simply appropri-
ate it creatively by adding new expression or aesthetics from the per-
spective of the consumer, is meant to create leeway for the courts to
determine types of activity, such as appropriation art, that are socially
desirable and therefore principally permissible, even though the fre-
quency and the intensity of those activities must be confined to an
optimal level. In this respect, the Second Circuit took the correct ap-
proach in Cariou v. Prince.
Where one could argue the court was wrong is at setting the requi-
site level of care for the defendant’s actions. It did so by essentially
arguing that the transformative character of the secondary use up-
stages not only commercialism but also the highly creative nature of
the published copyrighted material that has been appropriated.364
The court also argued that the fourth factor favored Prince because
Cariou had “not actively marketed his work or sold work for signifi-
cant sums, and nothing in the record suggests that anyone will not
now purchase Cariou’s work, or derivative non-transformative works
(whether Cariou’s own or licensed by him) as a result of the market
space that Prince’s work has taken up.”365
There is nothing to suggest that the level of activities related to
appropriation art would be suboptimal if photographers were entitled
to control the uses of their works by appropriation artists under some
circumstances, especially when the profits springing from those art
markets are soaring. Prince sold eight of his Cariou-inspired artworks
for $10,480,000. He also received works of painter Larry Rivers and
the proposition that transformativeness rests on the meaning ascribed to a subse-
quent copy of an earlier work by the readers). In this sense, Heymann argues,
even an original work fixed into a tangible medium of expression has a trans-
formative character because it imperfectly represents some intangible ideal ob-
ject or notion in the author’s mind. Id. at 457–65. Heymann argues that this
notion of consumer perception constituting a determinant of transformativeness
is in line with the Supreme Court’s definition of transformativeness in Campbell,
where the crucial aspect was held to be whether the secondary use “adds some-
thing new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with
new expression, meaning, or message.” Id. at 447 (quoting Campbell v. Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994)). Heymann further examines the possi-
bility of there existing various interpretative communities with the result of the
same secondary use being perceived differently by different people. Id. at 455–56.
The latter is an aspect that needs to be considered when balancing the equities
involved in a given dispute. Id.; see also Jonathan Francis, On Appropriation:
Cariou v. Prince and Measuring Contextual Transformation in Fair Use, 29
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 681, 684 (2014). Cariou is illustrative of the notion that
even minimal physical interferences with an earlier work may well give rise to a
transformative use in the copyright sense.
364. Cariou, 714 F.3d at 708.
365. Id. at 709.
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sculptor Richard Serra in exchange for some other pieces of the Canal
Zone series. Being required to hand over a slice of that pie to Cariou
would not undermine his incentives to keep on trying to change other
artists’ works “into something that’s completely different”366 as he
himself described his art.
The fact that Cariou himself would not have liked his documenta-
tion of Rastafarian culture to look like pop art at all does not change
anything in this analysis. A photography book like Yes Rasta made its
author a trifling sum of $8,000. In his position, another photographer
would have wholeheartedly negotiated a license agreement.367 And
even if there would always be artists like Cariou who would firmly
hold the line against such a prospect, there are a plethora of published
works available for an appropriation artist to draw upon. To counter
that argument, the defendant should be called upon to provide a justi-
fication for getting to copy the specific earlier work to promote his ar-
tistic purposes. For the assessment of the fourth factor this should
mean that appropriation artists owe a duty of care not to usurp mar-
kets that did not actually incite the production of the earlier work in
the sense that they were not envisaged at the time that the work was
created or at some later point.
It turns out that the commercial nature of the secondary use is the
most significant parameter for regulating the level of care that the
appropriation artist must exercise. Intense commercialism, either in
terms of the quantity of lucrative merchandise placed on the market
or with regard to the overindulgent monopoly profits that are realiza-
ble in the market where the transformative work is sold, would indi-
cate that the defendant has encroached upon benefits in which the
author of the earlier work should share. Ideally, this standard of care
would induce synergies and cross-fertilization between the different
forms of art with photographers actively seeking to create copyright-
able material that appropriation artists might wish to use as input for
their own works. Where the commercial nature of the secondary use is
incidental, as was the case in Seltzer v. Green Day, or economically
insubstantial, the fair use analysis may favor the defendant. In the
latter case, the law would cater for optimal activity levels by ensuring
that less prominent appropriation artists are endowed with the free-
dom of action that is requisite for practicing their art.368
366. Id. at 699.
367. Appropriation art may well give rise to instances where the value of the later
work greatly exceeds the price for which the copyright owner would be willing to
tolerate an otherwise undesirable dealing by an appropriation artist. Cf. Gordon,
Excuse and Justification in the Law of Fair Use, supra note 126, at 181.
368. A more balanced approach under which appropriation artists may be held liable
for copyright infringement despite the transformative nature of their contribu-
tion in cases where a licensing agreement seems reasonable would, apart from
maximizing social welfare, correspond with the fundamental function of the fair
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Last but not least, appropriation artists do not have to comply with
duties of care that would involve the avoidance of suppressing or even
destroying the market for the original work or its potential deriva-
tives. Whether the secondary use renders the earlier work less desira-
ble, as a result of the criticism that has been subjected to or due to its
association with the expressive purposes of the appropriation artist, is
inconsequential to the outcome of the fair use analysis.
F. Uses Facilitating the Access to Information
Thanks to our technological advances, a vast amount of informa-
tion is now publicly available. The Internet, in particular, offers access
to information stored in countless globally interconnected networks.
Similarly, the number of books being published has increased tremen-
dously over the last decades. Without the possibility of effectively nav-
igating the plethora of available information, that public good cannot
be fully enjoyed and can even turn into a white elephant. Attempts to
create index and search tools would normally require some sort of
dealing with copyrighted works. Copyright law should make sure that
those activities are carried out at sufficiently high levels in order to
increase the utility derived from the public good without at the same
time disproportionally reducing the benefits to which the copyright
owners are entitled by virtue of their exclusive right.
Starting from Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.,369 the circuit courts have
rendered sound judgments that have clarified the law and set proper
standards of care. The defendant’s internet search engine displayed
its results in the form of picture thumbnails instead of text.370 Once a
search had been initiated, a computer program would crawl the web
gathering relevant images, which were then temporarily saved in Ar-
riba’s server before being turned into thumbnails.371 Double-clicking
on a thumbnail would lead the user to another webpage, the “Images
Attributes” page, where the original full-sized image featured was an
use doctrine, which has been to allow for expansions of copyright protection ex-
actly because it creates counterbalancing limitations to the exclusive right at the
same time. Its very existence as a safety valve encourages the courts to consider
additional benefits as internalized to the benefit of the copyright owner by virtue
of his or her exclusive right, if the balancing of the various equities involved sug-
gests that this makes economic sense. Scholars have traced this pattern back to
the early developments of the doctrine. See Matthew Sag, God in the Machine: A
New Structural Analysis of Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 11 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 381, 414 (2005). The more courts explore the transformative nature
of secondary uses, the more they are able to appreciate the magnitude of the so-
cial benefit resulting from such dealings with earlier works and become able to
balance it with the economic interests of copyright owners.
369. Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 280 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2002).
370. Id. at 938.
371. Id.
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inline link.372 On the same page the user would find some technical
information about the photo and a link to the originating website
while being exposed to paid advertisements.373 Later on, Arriba
changed the configuration of the results page.374 Each thumbnail was
accompanied by two separate links. The “details link” produced a
webpage similar to the “Images Attributes” page, the only difference
being that the former displayed a thumbnail and not the original im-
age.375 When clicked upon, the “source link” would cause two windows
to emerge. Similar to the “Image Attributes” page, the original full-
sized image was imported directly from the originating image into the
first window (inline linking).376 The second window simply displayed
the webpage where the image was found by the web crawler
(framing).377
Photographer Leslie A. Kelly filed suit for copyright infringement
after finding out that a couple of his images of the American West had
been reproduced and displayed by Arriba.378
In its fair use analysis, the Ninth Circuit had to ascertain first
whether the use of thumbnails in the defendant’s search engine was
fair.379 Addressing the first factor, the court found the secondary use
to be transformative because it served a function that was different
from the aesthetic purpose of the original works since those
thumbnails “benefit the public by enhancing information gathering
techniques on the internet.”380 The commercial character of Arriba’s
use was deemed “more incidental and less exploitative in nature than
more traditional types of commercial use.”381 Arriba was not making
profit from the sale of the images themselves but from paid advertis-
ing attracted by its internet search services.382 Commercialism was
simply not prevalent enough to trump the transformative nature of
the defendant’s use. Accordingly, the first factor was held to tilt the
assessment in Arriba’s favor.383 Although the court gives us the im-
pression of intending to declare a winner for each assessment of the
individual factors, it seems to have correlated the first and the fourth
factor by observing that the thumbnails could not possibly supplant
the original works due to the lack of an illustrative or expressive pur-
372. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 939.
375. Id.
376. Id.
377. Id. at 938–39.
378. Id. at 938.
379. Id. at 939.
380. Id. at 942.
381. Id. at 940.
382. Id.
383. Id. at 942.
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pose.384 In that regard, the court adopted a holistic view by duly con-
sidering the public interest in securing incentives for creativity and
the need to allow room for welfare-enhancing dealings with the earlier
works.
Despite the creative nature of the earlier works, the second factor
weighted only slightly in favor of Kelly because his pictures were pub-
lished, which meant that the author had already been able to exercise
the strong right of first publication.385
In turn, the court concluded that the third factor was neutral.386
Arriba may have copied entire expressive works, but nevertheless, the
amount and substantiality of the appropriated material was, in the
view of the court, proportional to the legitimate purpose of facilitating
internet browsing by improving the usefulness of a search engine.
Even though the court correlated the third with the first factor, essen-
tially implying that copying was not excessive,387 it did not directly
examine whether the respective activity levels were excessive in light
of the possible impact of the secondary use on plaintiff’s markets and
the value of his copyrights. Instead, the court concluded its assess-
ment of the third factor, finding that it did not favor any of the parties
to the dispute.388
To assess the fourth factor, the opinion first identifies the copy-
right owner’s actual and potential markets.389 Kelly’s photos could
bring custom to his website where advertising space along with books
and travel packages were being sold.390 Potential licensees included
other websites and stock photo databases. The defendant’s
thumbnails could not harm those markets or depreciate the value of
the underlying copyrights because they could not possibly serve as
substitutes for the original images. Any attempt to create larger
images from thumbnails of lower-resolution would bring along grave
reductions in quality, which would render the product unmarket-
able.391 Creating low-resolution thumbnails actually constitutes a
means to exercise care toward the legitimate interests of the copyright
owner. Interestingly, the Ninth Circuit’s opinion considered this as-
pect under the first factor as well without technically correlating the
two factors. “Having considered the four fair use factors” the court
found that “two weigh in favor of Arriba, one is neutral and one
weighs slightly in favor of Kelly” and concluded that “Arriba’s use of
384. Id. at 941–42.
385. Id. at 943.
386. Id.
387. Id.
388. Id.
389. Id. at 943–44.
390. Id.
391. Id.
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Kelly’s images as thumbnails in its search engine is a fair use.”392
Even though the fair use analysis did not result from a proper correla-
tion of the factors, the court nevertheless determined the proper stan-
dard of care to induce the optimal levels of activity.
On the other hand, those inline-linking and framing practices of
Arriba—causing the search engine to display full-sized images—did
not pass muster with the fair use inquiry as they were obviously
usurping the photographer’s markets.393 Here, the court correlated
the first with the fourth factor, reiterating the principle that the less
transformative the new use is the more likely a finding of market
harm becomes.394 This time the third factor clearly favored Kelly be-
cause copying took place to promote the illegitimate purpose of provid-
ing users with access to full-sized copyrighted images within the
environment of Arriba’s websites.395 While assessing the first factor,
the court had already noted that these particular secondary uses had
a weaker claim to the fair use defense as they did not offer any social
benefit that was comparable to the informational value accruing from
making thumbnails of copyrighted pictures available through a search
engine.396 Again, the conclusion of the court was formulated as an an-
nouncement of the number of factors favoring each party.397 None of
the four factors favored Arriba with respect to the display of full-sized
images. It appears from this case that the exercise of due care depends
largely on ensuring that the images featured in a search results page
do not function as substitutes for the original works.398
The Ninth Circuit had the opportunity to elaborate upon its analy-
sis in Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.,399 which dealt with similar
practices. Google, which was also a party to this dispute, was allegedly
infringing the plaintiff’s copyrights in the photographs of nude models
through its search service for image content called “Google Image
Search.”400 On this occasion, Google was able to avoid direct liability
392. Id. at 944.
393. Id. at 948. The court’s separate analysis of the technological services involved is
indicative of a willingness to apply appropriate copyright limitations to each indi-
vidual innovative aspect of a service bundle. Khio D. Dang, Kelly v. Arriba Soft
Corp.: Copyright Limitations on Technological Innovation on the Internet, 18
SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 389, 402–03 (2002).
394. Kelly, 280 F.3d at 947.
395. Id. at 948.
396. Id. at 947.
397. Id. at 948.
398. As Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 61, 71–73 (2002), has suggested, the Ninth Circuit effectuated an “encour-
aging” balance between the public interests in the broad dissemination of infor-
mation through the internet and the copyright owners’ economic interests vis-a`-
vis potential markets for digital distribution of their works.
399. Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007).
400. Id. at 1155.
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for inline-linking and -framing since the search engine neither stored
nor communicated copies of the original works to the users.401 Google
simply provided HTML instructions directing the browsers of users’
computers to websites where those earlier works were stored.402
Hence, the fair use analysis of the Ninth Circuit reviewing the denial
of the district court to grant a preliminary injunction against Google
focused on the secondary use that involved the creation and display of
copies in the form of thumbnails that were saved in Google’s
servers.403
Turning to the assessment of the four factors, the opinion followed
the principles set out in Kelly. In both cases, the conclusions on the
first three factors were the same.404 What differentiated the two dis-
putes in factual terms was that Perfect 10 had already developed a
market for reduced-size images downloadable onto mobile phones.
Hence, the plaintiff was able to come up with a legal argument that
the secondary use harmed its markets because the thumbnails could
effectively supplant the demand for the original images.405 Unfortu-
nately for Perfect 10, there was no evidence suggesting that internet
users had downloaded its images for cell phone use.406 With the po-
tential harm remaining just hypothetical, the fourth factor was found
to favor neither party.407 Weighting the significant benefit to the pub-
lic derived from Google’s internet search service against a flimsy pos-
sibility of harm, the court was not at all hesitant to rule that the
secondary use was fair.408 To put it differently, the standard of care
imposed on third parties does not require them to take precautionary
measures against harm that is only theoretically likely or purely im-
aginable damage.
Major libraries consented to Google creating scanned copies of
their collections to set up an innovative search service offering the
utility of text- and data-mining tools.409 With the aid of Google’s prod-
401. Id. at 1159–63.
402. Id. at 1155.
403. Id. at 1163.
404. Both cases illustrate the notion that the re-contextualization of an earlier work
would give rise to a transformative secondary use even in cases of verbatim copy-
ing, provided that the copy serves a different function. See Michael D. Murray,
What Is Transformative? An Explanatory Synthesis of the Convergence of Trans-
formation and Predominant Purpose in Copyright Fair Use Law, 11 CHI.-KENT. J.
INTELL. PROP. 260, 273 (2012) (examining the development of the analysis under
the first factor and showing how courts have given effect to the utilitarian pur-
poses of copyright protection while assessing the transformativeness of secondary
uses).
405. Perfect 10, 508 F.3d at 1168.
406. Id.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Authors Guild v. Google, Inc., 804 F.3d 202, 207 (2d Cir. 2015).
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uct, users could obtain information as to whether a particular word or
phrase is referenced in a book and, if yes, in what frequency, along
with a maximum of three short snippets containing the search term.
In return, the participating libraries were allowed to maintain digital
copies of the books included into the project under the condition that
they would not be put in uses infringing copyrights of third parties.410
Confronted with a copyright infringement claim filed by three au-
thors, Google successfully argued a fair use defense before the district
court, which granted summary judgement in its favor.411 On appeal,
the Second Circuit had to review the assessment of the lower court’s
finding that both the “search” and the “snippet view” functions of
Google’s service constituted fair uses of the earlier authorial works.412
The defendant’s enterprise has resulted in a manifold social wel-
fare increase.413 It made it possible for researchers to track language
usage or even the lack thereof in all possible contexts throughout a
particularly long period of time. Some rudimentary bibliographical in-
formation along with data about the terms mostly referenced in each
book is made available to the public. The users are also provided with
links to electronic stores and a list of library collections where the
book can be found. By allowing the user to view the term in a rela-
tively narrow context within the text, which is nevertheless enough
for facilitating a decision as to whether the book is of interest to him or
her, the “snippet view” function increases the amount of information
about the books available worldwide. It does not come as a surprise
that the court held the secondary use to be highly transformative.414
With its use of the earlier works, Google added something new, ad-
vancing the further purpose of making significant information about
those books available to the searchers. The plaintiffs argued that
Google’s commercial motivation should militate in favor of denying
fair use.415 According to their argument, the defendant is a “profit-
motivated” entity planning to leverage its control of book searches to
fortify its dominance of the Internet search market.416 Even if the
profit reaped is indirect, since it is not attributable to the operation of
“Google books” itself, commercialism was still, in the view of the plain-
tiffs, rampant enough to outweigh the transformative purpose of the
use.417 The court gave that argument a short shrift.418
410. Id.
411. Id. at 206–07.
412. Id. at 207–29.
413. Id. at 214–18.
414. Id.
415. Id. at 207.
416. Id. at 218.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 218–19.
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Referring to the examples of “universally accepted forms of fair
use,” such as news reporting and commentary, Judge Leval proved the
point that transformative character and commercial motivation are
not mutually exclusive.419 He saw no reason why commercialism
should outweigh the highly transformative purpose of the secondary
use.420 Importantly, the opinion ruled that the first factor favored the
defendant, after stressing the absence of significant substitutive com-
petition.421 This means essentially that the court correlated the first
and the fourth factors, something which also becomes apparent from
its reference to the relationship between those two factors as it was
described in Campbell. Thus, the court truly examined how the char-
acter and the nature of the secondary use affects the outcome of the
overall balance between the profit-maximizing interests of the copy-
right owner and the public interest in letting the social benefit accru-
ing from defendant’s transformative purpose materialize.422
Although the earlier works were expressive, the social benefit gen-
erated by the transformative purpose of the new use and the incapac-
ity of Google’s service to function as a meaningful substitute for the
original books meant that the second factor also favored fair use.423
Rightfully, the court correlated the second factor with the first and the
fourth factors in order to examine the effect that the nature of the
earlier work may have upon the overall assessment. Turning to ex-
amine the third factor, the opinion did not lose sight of its correlation
with the fourth factor. The more extensive the copying is or the more
qualitatively substantial the appropriated material is, the more likely
it becomes that the secondary use will usurp plaintiff’s markets.424
Google may have copied entire books, but this was necessary for creat-
ing a machine-readable text and a corresponding index for each book
without the respective unauthorized digital copy being revealed to the
user of the “search” function. In addition, the amount and substantial-
ity of the copyrighted material appropriated by Google was deemed
proportional to the transformative purpose advanced by the first
factor.425
419. Id. at 219.
420. See id. at 218.
421. Id.
422. Importantly, the court was able to ascertain the socially beneficial contribution of
the secondary use and affirm the transformative nature of Google’s service even
though the defendant had engaged in excessive verbatim copying of entire works.
Id. at 220. Hence, transformativeness was properly assessed in light of copyright
law’s purposes. Id.; see also PATRY, supra note 98, § 3:9 (noting that fair use does
not require changes to the original and observing the development of transforma-
tiveness into a term of art serving teleological purposes).
423. Google, 804 F.3d at 220.
424. Id. at 221.
425. Id. at 221–23.
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Equally, the defendant had taken all the precautionary measures
necessary for ensuring that the “snippet view” function would not
serve as an effective substitute for the books about which it was meant
to inform the public. There were various limitations to the availability
of snippets that all together contributed to the users being able to ac-
cess “only small and randomly scattered portions of a book.”426 For
that reason, only one snippet per page was permitted. It was also only
one of every ten pages that was snipped. No snippets from books were
made accessible if the nature of the earlier work was such that the
users could avail themselves of a book’s value from reading a sole
snippet.427 This was applicable to works such as dictionaries or
cookbooks.428
Reaching the stage where the fourth factor had to be assessed, the
court started its analysis by setting its correlation with the first factor
as the premise of the discussion.429 Highly transformative uses are
obviously less likely to usurp the plaintiff’s markets, especially when
they serve a different purpose than the original work. Of course, it
cannot be excluded that even a transformative use may give rise to a
product that is highly substitutable with the copyrighted work of a
third party. Google’s snippets were far from capable of having such
market effect.430
The court did not exclude the possibility of other constellations
under which consumer demand for access to the text of a given work
could be satisfied through Google’s snippets.431 In that event, some
sort of economic loss would be possible in the form of either some fore-
gone sales to ultimate consumers or a decrease in libraries’ demand
for the snipped book. However, even if such harm was bound to occur,
there was no indication that its magnitude would be grave enough to
substantially harm the copyright owners’ markets. On top of every-
thing, snippets are by their nature more likely to satisfy consumer
426. Id. at 222.
427. Id. at 210.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 223.
430. In that regard, Google also highlights the legal insignificance of presumptions
within the fair use analysis. Systematic copying of entire works is not unfair per
se. See PATRY, supra note 98, § 5:3. Dealings with earlier copyrighted works in-
volving the mass digitization of books had already been addressed by the Second
Circuit in Authors Guild v. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2014). There, the
court held that the creation of digital copies for the purpose of allowing full-text
book searches that only showed the page numbers on which a search term ap-
pears in a given work without displaying any “snippets” containing that term
amounted to fair use. HathiTrust, 755 F.3d at 103. Such excessive copying was
exempted from copyright liability on the grounds of fair use when carried out to
allow the print-disabled to obtain access to copyrighted books. Id. at 101–03.
431. Google, 804 F.3d at 224–25.
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demand for acquiring or confirming non-copyrightable factual infor-
mation such as when a user inquires upon the date a historical event
occurred and is able to ascertain the relevant data through the use of
Google’s “snippet view” service. The event of a user satisfying his or
her need of consuming an author’s copyrightable expression with the
aid of a snippet was considered by the court to be a rather remote
possibility.432
In other words, the alleged harm was neither reasonably foresee-
able nor significant enough to justify the imposition of a standard of
care that would induce the provider of an internet search service to
lower the levels of its welfare-enhancing activity.
The fair use analysis of the Second Circuit in Authors Guild v.
Google, Inc. is paradigmatic. Each factor, and the equities manifested
therein, was assessed on the grounds of its impact on the overall fair
use calculus after being correlated with the other factors and the equi-
ties they represented. In this respect, the Second Circuit has indeed
administrated the fair use analysis as a truly multifactorial test im-
plementing the structured balancing test required by copyright’s rule
of reason. After considering the utilitarian purpose of copyright to pro-
mote the public interest in knowledge dissemination and concomi-
tantly protect the interests of the copyright holder, the court managed
to determine an appropriate negligence standard for users to opti-
mally regulate their levels of an activity that is socially desirable.
VI. CONCLUSION
Fair use has come a really long way. The fundamental principle
underpinning the doctrine is fairly simple and has been well appreci-
ated all along. An inroad to the intellectual property right is estab-
lished to allow for some socially desirable dealings with earlier
copyrighted works to emerge. To the extent that the copyright owner
must succumb to the uncompensated use of his or her creation in some
contexts, there is some reduction in authorial incentives, which counts
as a social loss within the fair use calculus. Hence, the socially desira-
ble secondary use should not disproportionally interfere with the copy-
right owner’s interest in maximizing the financial returns from his or
her creation and ultimately determining the use of the resource form-
ing the subject matter of the exclusive right. In practice, however, the
trade-offs between the social benefit added by a secondary use and the
social loss associated with reduced creative incentives would not al-
ways be easy to determine. Nevertheless, the large amount of case law
involving a fair use analysis has provided us with a lot of information
relevant to the application of the doctrine. We are now able to predict
432. Id.
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with a high degree of certainty how particular types of uses are likely
to be assessed by the courts.
In the meantime, the courts have further developed the relevant
legal principles in a way that promotes a more informed consideration
of the equities involved. When assessing the transformative character
of a given secondary use under the first factor, for instance, the focus
is not on the phenotype of that use but rather on the actual social
benefit that the defendant is contributing thereby. Equally, the as-
sessment of the fourth factor entails a precise identification of the rel-
evant market according to criteria that are directed at measuring the
importance of internalizing the corresponding benefits for maintain-
ing creative incentives. Thus, the courts have lived up to the challenge
of developing teleological criteria for assessing the four factors in light
of copyright law’s rule of reason. Academic scholarship did its part too,
having undoubtedly exercised significant influence on the develop-
ment of the law.
Apparently, even socially desirable dealings with earlier works are
not unconditionally exempted. Fair use requires secondary users to
take into account the legitimate interests of copyright owners. In this
respect, the fair use calculus operates as a negligence standard. But
this does not render copyright infringement a tort mirroring negli-
gence. It is neither necessary nor advisable, in my view, to restructure
the tort of copyright infringement in a manner where it would end up
emulating the tort of negligence to rectify any possible shortcoming
that current copyright law may feature. Furthermore, the current le-
gal framework is appropriate for an adequate evaluation of the argu-
ments supported by copyright optimists and copyright pessimists433
in light of the policies served by copyright law. The Copyright Act has
in fact adopted a mixed system of liability. Accordingly, copyright in-
fringement mirrors trespass upon property for which the defendant is
strictly liable, whereas negligence is utilized to optimize the levels of
specific activities undertaken by third parties, which require some
form of dealing with an earlier work of authorship. Fair use involves
the imposition of negligence standards for socially desirable activities
in order to optimize activity levels. The imposition of care duties to-
ward the economic interests of the copyright owner aims at ensuring
that the social loss resulting from any reduction in authorial incen-
tives associated with uncompensated uses will not outweigh the social
value derived from specific secondary uses. The doctrine of fair use
induces users to optimally regulate their levels of activity. Overall, the
appreciation of the tort of copyright infringement as a mixed system of
433. On this distinction see GOLDSTEIN, supra note 92, at 10–11 (explaining the maxi-
malist and the minimalist approach to the scope of copyright protection).
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liability, providing for a separate negligence standard to regulate ac-
tivity levels in light of copyright’s rule of reason, offers valuable in-
sight into the nature and function of the fair use doctrine.
